DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REPORT TO THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

VOLUME III

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ANALYSES

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

MARCH 1995

DoD VOLUME III

Department of the Army Analyses and Recommendations

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A. AMERICA'S ARMY [THE VISION]: A TOTAL FORCE...TRAINED AND READY TO FIGHT...SERVING THE NATION AT HOME AND ABROAD...A STRATEGIC FORCE...CAPABLE OF DECISIVE VICTORY!

America's Army is composed of Active duty, National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers, Army civilian employees, and families.

America's Army is a well-trained and ready Total Force.

America's Army exists to serve the Nation, performing a wide variety of tasks wherever needed, at home or abroad.

America's Army is the core of American strategic power.

America's Army can deliver what the American people demand: success at whatever we are called on to do at minimum cost in resources and lives.

B. AMERICA'S ARMY INTO THE 21st CENTURY: USING THE BRAC PROCESS TO TRANSFORM FROM A COLD WAR TO A POWER PROJECTION ARMY.

The Army's leaders and soldiers are committed to realizing the vision of becoming America's 21st Century Army. Our primary effort is the creation of a power projection Army, sufficiently robust and versatile to accommodate the demands of the national strategy. To accomplish this end, the Army must sustain the quality of its people while developing and implementing new doctrine, organizations, materiel, training, leadership development programs, and soldier support systems, all of which will facilitate a trained and ready Army able to meet global challenges today and into the 21st Century.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process supports this vision by providing a means of divesting of unneeded infrastructure and bases, many of which are vestiges of the Cold War era. The Army recognizes the complementary nature of the need to reshape and resource Army forces with the need to reduce base operating costs. Nothing less than a fundamental reengineering will suffice. Our BRAC recommendations reflect this thinking.

These are times of profound change. Our BRAC 1995 effort recognizes the imperative that a power projection Army encompasses the active (military and civilian) force, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve. Today's Army has a plan for change and growth that uses the BRAC process effectively. We are confident that our Vision, coupled with determination and good leadership, will produce the vitality to overcome obstacles to reshaping our base infrastructure, enabling ***America's Army*** to be responsive to our Nation's needs.

THE ARMY OF THE 21st CENTURY

- **A STRATEGIC GROUND FORCE CAPABLE OF DECISIVE VICTORY**
- **VERSATILE, HIGH-TECH, HIGHLY TRAINED & READY**
- **RAPID AND DEPLOYABLE, CONUS-BASED, POWER PROJECTION ARMY**
- **CAPABLE OF MOBILIZATION, SUSTAINMENT, AND RECONSTITUTION OF FORCES RAPIDLY**
- **IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE FOR AMERICA'S SOLDIERS**



Figure 1.

C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The Army recommends the following BRAC 95 closures:

Aviation-Troop Command, MO
East Fort Baker, CA
Bayonne, NJ
Bellmore, WA
Big Coppett Key, FL
Camp Bonneville, WA
Branch USDB, Lompoc, CA
Caven Point, NJ
Fort Chaffee, AR
Concepts Analysis Agency, MD
Fitzsimons AMC, CO
Hingham Cohasset, MA
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
Information Systems Software Command, VA
Camp Kilmer, NJ
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Missoula, MT
Camp Pedricktown, NJ
Fort Pickett, VA
Price Support Center, IL
Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore, MD
Rec Support Center, NC
Red River Depot, TX
Rio Vista USAR, CA
Fort Ritchie, MD
Savanna Depot, IL
Selfridge Army Depot, MI
Seneca Army Depot, NY
Stratford Engine Plant, CT
Sudbury Annex, MA
Fort Totten, NY
Valley Grove, WV

(2) The Army recommends the following BRAC 95 realignments:

Fort Buchanan, PR	Fort Greely, AK	Fort Lee, VA
Detroit Arsenal, MI	Fort Hamilton, NY	Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Fort Dix, NJ	Fort Hunter Liggett, CA	Fort Meade, MD
Dugway Proving Grounds, UT	Kelly Support Center, PA	Sierra Army Depot, CA

(3) Change to previous BRAC Commission decision. The Army recommends one change to the 1991 BRAC Commission: Regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance, do not relocate environmental and occupational toxicology research from Fort Detrick to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

A. PURPOSE.

BRAC is a major component of the Army's reshaping effort. Reducing excess base structure allows scarce funds to be spent on the highest priorities while maintaining installations with the highest military value. The closures and realignments announced in previous rounds together with those being recommended in BRAC 95 will enable America's Army of the 21st Century to meet its future requirements.

B. DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 (BRAC LAW).

Part A, Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended, establishes the exclusive procedures by which the Secretary of Defense may pursue realignment or closure of military installations inside the United States, with certain exceptions. The law establishes an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's recommendations in calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

The purpose of the law "is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." With few exceptions, the law is "the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States."

C. BRAC HISTORY - ARMY IN TRANSITION,

The Army has taken careful and deliberate steps to eliminate unnecessary bases throughout the world during the past six years. The Army led DoD's early BRAC efforts during 1988-1990, closing 77 installations, laying away 7, and realigning 5. The mid-term efforts during 1990-1994 focused primarily on downsizing in Europe, where the Army announced sweeping plans to close 7 of every 10 sites. At the same time, the Army continued to reshape infrastructure in the United States, gaining approval from the 1991 and 1993 BRAC Commissions to close 6 installations and realign 9 others, along with realigning numerous laboratory sites. The recommendations made during this round, BRAC 95, will complete the Army's reshaping efforts in the United States.



Figure 2.

(1) 1988 Commission.

In **1988,** the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure began to eliminate unnecessary installations and make more efficient use of base operating dollars. The Army **was an** aggressive participant in this effort. Of the **77** installations announced for closure, **74** have **closed** already, and the remainder will close down by fall of 1995.

CLOSURES

Alabama Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), AL
Army Materiel Technology Laboratory, MA
Army National Guard Facility (NG)
Bennett, CO
Cameron Station, **VA**
Cape St. George, FL
Coosa River, AL
Defense Mapping Agency **(DMA), VA**
Fort Des Moines, **IA** (Partial)
Fort **Douglas,** UT
Hamilton **Army** Airfield, **CA**
Indiana Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), IN
Jefferson Proving Ground, In
Kapalama MR, HI
Lexington Army Depot, KY
Navajo AD, AZ
New Orleans Military Ocean
Terminal, **LA**
Nike Aberdeen, MD
Nike **Kansas** City, MO
Pontiac Storage Facility, MI

53 Family Housing sites, various locations
Fort Sheridan, IL

Presidio of San Francisco, CA
US Army Reserve Center (USARC), Gaithersburg, MD
Tacony Warehouse, PA
Fort Wingate, NM

REALIGNMENTS

Fort Devens
Fort Dix
Fort Huachuca

Pueblo Army Depot
Umatilla Army Depot

(2) 1990 DoD Closures.

In early 1990, the Secretary of Defense announced a number of restructuring initiatives. Congress reacted by challenging the selection of installations being closed. This led to the passage of the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, which invalidated the closure of installations employing 300 or more civilians, or any realignment entailing reductions of 1,000 employees or more than 50 percent of the civilian work force. These thresholds did not affect the following initiatives, which were allowed to proceed.

CLOSURES (Inactivation to caretaker status)

Detroit Tank Plant, MI (partial)
Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, IN
Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, KS
Lima Tank Plant, OH (partial)
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, TX
Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, LA
Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS
Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, PA
Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant, OK

(3) BRAC 91 - 1991 COMMISSION.

In 1991, the Commission approved the Army's recommendation to close five and realign six installations. Additionally, 17 laboratories were recommended for realignment. These actions allow the Army's major commands to begin needed restructuring efforts, like consolidating research laboratories, creating training warfighting centers, finding a permanent home for the Joint Readiness Training Center, consolidating depots, and reshaping the maneuver-sized installations. Of the five installations announced for closure, three have closed already with the remainder closing by 1996.

The new procedures allowed the Army to reexamine some of the recommendations of the 1988 Commission and to make more cost effective changes (e.g. retention of Information Systems Command at Fort Huachuca instead of relocating to Fort Devens).

CLOSURES

Maior

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Ord, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA

Other

Woodbridge Research Facility, **VA**

REALIGNMENTS

Army Research Laboratories, Adelphi, MD
Aviation Systems Command and
Troop Support Command, MO
Fort Chaffee, **AR**
Fort Dix, **NJ**
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Fort Polk, **LA**
Tri-Service Project Reliance

(4) BRAC 93 - 1993 COMMISSION.

In 1993, the Army continued its efforts to tailor its infrastructure to meet the needs of a smaller force. The Commission supported the following recommendations but disapproved several other major reshaping efforts. The Army expects to complete the closure of Vint Hill by 1998.

CLOSURE	REALIGNMENTS
Vint Hill Farms Station, VA	Fort Belvoir, VA
	Fort Monmouth, NJ
	Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
	Tooele Army Depot, UT

(5) OVERSEAS CLOSURES.

Overseas reductions are extensive, but they are less visible than those in the United States. The Army is closing 7 of every 10 sites in Europe (see Figure 3), roughly equivalent to closing some of the largest installations in the United States: Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, Fort Stewart, Fort Lewis, Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Campbell, Fort Bliss, Fort Carson, Fort Knox, and Redstone Arsenal. In addition, the Army will eventually lose 30 percent of its installations in Korea and 100 percent of its installations in Panama.



Figure 3.

D. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) GUIDANCE.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 7 January 1994, established overarching policy guidance concerning BRAC 95. The military services were challenged to reduce base structure capacity commensurate with approved roles and missions, planned force drawdowns, and programmed workload reductions over the five year defense plan. Additionally, OSD emphasized the requirement to consolidate workload and functions across service lines to reduce excess capacity. Five Joint Cross-Service Groups under OSD's leadership were formed to develop opportunities for cross-service realignments. These committees developed closure and realignment alternatives in the following areas: Depot Maintenance, Test and Evaluation, Laboratories, Medical Treatment Facilities, and Undergraduate Pilot Training.

Additional OSD guidance was provided in the following memoranda:

Policy Memorandum One - 31 May 1994
Policy Memorandum Two - 23 November 1994
Policy Memorandum Three - 29 December 1994

E. ARMYGUIDANCE.

Army Chief of Staff Memorandum, dated 21 March 1994, identified The Army Basing Study (TABS) of the Management Directorate, as the primary coordinating office for BRAC 95. In preparing for the final round of base closures, the senior Army leadership provided TABS and the Army Staff with the following guidance:

(1) Support the needs of an Army of the 21st Century.

(2) Ensure that recommendations are consistent with The Army Stationing Strategy.

(3) Reduce excess infrastructure while preserving readiness.

(4) Size Army base structure properly.

(5) Ensure BRAC analysis is rigorous, fair, and auditable.

(6) Maintain the Army's power projection capability.

(7) Retain the unique capabilities of both heavy and light Combat Training Centers.

(8) Locate Reserve Component activities onto Active Component installations where possible.

(9) Consider the consolidation of schools and logistical management functions.

(10) Where feasible, move lease tenants onto Army owned property.

(11) Retain affordable, world-class power projection platforms as enduring installations.

F. RESPONSIBILITIES.

The Secretary of the Army - with the advice of the Chief of Staff, approves the Army BRAC recommendations.

The Under Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff, Army - supervises the development of the Army's BRAC 95 recommendations.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment) - provides policy guidance for all base realignment and closure initiatives in the Department of the Army,

The Director of Management and The Army Basing Study (TABS) Group - develops, evaluates and documents BRAC alternatives that are consistent with the DoD selection criteria and force structure plan, and recommends alternatives to the Secretary of the Army for submission to the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) - provides certified data concerning installation use, capacity, and construction; oversees the development of environmental baseline studies; implements all BRAC actions.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) - stations the Army and is the staff proponent for unit activations, inactivations, relocations, and other force structure changes. DCSOPS prepares, coordinates, and publishes The Army Stationing Strategy.

Major Army Commands (MACOMs) - identifies future requirements and suggests restructuring initiatives; develops certified responses to Army data calls; review Army proposals for closure or realignment.

The Army Audit Agency **(AAA)** - audits the Army BRAC process, maintains an audit team within TABS, and conducts on-site reviews at installations and MACOM headquarters.

G. ARMY BRAC TIMELINES.



Figure 4.

In late 1993, preparation for BRAC 95 began with a comprehensive assessment of all past and ongoing BRAC actions. During Spring 1994, the Army initiated its installation assessments using data provided by each of the **Army's** Major Army Commands (MACOMs). The Army staff subsequently visited each installation that met legislatively established BRAC thresholds. During the summer, the Army completed military value assessments for its installations and began analyzing an initial list of study candidates. In late 1994 and early 1995, the Army completed its analysis, integrated appropriate Joint Cross-Service proposals, and developed a list of final recommendations.

H. PROCESS.

The Army BRAC process is consistent with applicable legislation, is based upon DoD Selection Criteria (Figure **5),** and employs qualitative assessments and quantitative techniques to identify closure candidates. The process begins with a review of all Army installations (Figures 6 & **7),** and follows with **an** assessment of qualitative information on each site. Installations are then **analyzed** in quantitative terms, using military attributes derived from DoD Selection Criteria 1-4. Key to the Army process **is** its Stationing Strategy, a long range assessment of future basing requirements. Installation assessments are compared with basing requirements to identify installations for study. Subsequent analysis assesses the cost, economic, community and environmental impacts of each closure alternative (Figure 8). The following paragraphs provide additional details on the process.



Figure 5.

(1) Installation Inventory. As in earlier BRAC studies, the Army conducted a comprehensive review of all installations. This review identified 97 primary installations and a number of lease sites. See Figures *6* & **7.**



Figure 6.



Figure 7.

(2) Installation Reviews. Installation data was assembled from certified sources and consolidated in a single format to develop an appreciation for the unique characteristics of each base. The reviews contain a historical perspective, geographic information, missions, units supported, budgets, personnel summaries, past BRAC actions, environmental considerations, facility capacities, economic profiles, and unique characteristics. Extracts of the installation reviews are contained in Reference Volume I.

(3) Installation Environmental Analyses. The environmental analysis **was** performed by an Environmental Review Committee (ERC) with subject matter experts from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. The ERC collected and analyzed Installation Environmental Baseline Summaries **(IEBS)** and produced an initial environmental assessment for each installation. Subsequent analysis refined environmental assessments for installations under consideration for closure or realignment.



Figure **8.**

(4) Installation Assessments. The BRAC ***95*** Installation Assessment **(IA)** Program, described in Reference Volume II, is a quantitative assessment of all primary installations. The **IA** Program, a centerpiece of the Army's analysis, includes a categorization of installations, development of measurable characteristics (attributes) based on the first four DoD Selection Criteria, collection of certified data, and calculation of relative installation merit by category.

(5) The **Army** Stationing Strategy. The **Army** Stationing Strategy provides an operational context for base closure planning and analysis. Derived from the National Military Strategy and the current force structure, it assesses future basing requirements.

(6) Military Value Assessment. Military Value Assessments represent the Department's best judgment on the relative merit of each installation and are the basis for selecting study candidates for additional study. The Army compared the results of the IA Program with the operational requirements in the Stationing Strategy before completing the Military Value Assessment. Installations with lower relative military value were selected for further study.

(7) Alternative Development: Once study candidates were selected and approved by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, the Army developed specific base closure and realignment alternatives. Those alternatives were derived from force structure decisions, the Army Stationing Strategy, previous BRAC reviews, Major **Army** Command (MACOM) recommendations, staff proposals, **and** Joint Cross-Service Group alternatives. (Appendix A provides the Army's assessment of Joint Cross-Service Group alternatives.)

(8) Evaluation of Alternatives: The number of alternatives analyzed depended in part on the nature of the study candidate. Each alternative underwent a cycle of analysis and refinement based upon feasibility, affordability, and economic and environmental impacts. Each alternative was also examined for consistency with DoD's force structure plan, The Army Stationing Strategy, and DoD selection criteria. The analysis used the following:

a. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model. COBRA, DoD's BRAC model for resource analysis, was used to measure the affordability of each recommendation (Criterion 5).

b. DoD's standard model to calculate the economic impacts (Criteria *6* & 7).

c. Installation Environmental Baseline Summaries (Criterion **8).**

d. Internal feasibility and affordability evaluations to calculate the Army's capability to execute the proposed action within the legislatively mandated execution period for BRAC 95.

(9) Audit Controls. The Army Audit Agency (AAA) provided comprehensive review and oversight by: reviewing algorithms used in the cost model (COBRA); evaluating standard factor computations; validating standard factors; and verifying mathematical calculations. In addition, AAA reviewed data used to compute the return on investment calculations for the final recommendations. These final reviews evaluated data sources, basic analytical approaches, and the validity of assumptions.

CHAPTER 2 - FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

1. THE ARMY.

The Army is a total force consisting of active component (Regular Army) and reserve component (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) forces and **Army** civilian employees. Army units are organized into combat, combat support and combat service support categories. Combat units include active and reserve component divisions, separate brigades, and special operations forces. Combat support forces (communications, intelligence, military police are examples), and combat service support forces (logistics such as supply and maintenance, transportation, and medical support) are assigned throughout the force structure, from battalion through echelons above corps. Increasingly, the Regular Army depends upon the reserve components for early deploying combat, combat support, and combat service support. Combat, combat support, and combat service support forces are normally organized and fight as part of an army, corps, division or Joint Task Force.

B. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE.

The Bottom Up Review in October 1993, directed the Army to reduce its active force from 12 to 10 divisions. The Army's force structure plan stabilizes the force at an active duty end strength of 495,000 soldiers as the Army prepares to transform into the force of the future -- Force XXI. The plan inactivates two continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs), three combat brigades, and two division headquarters and their divisional troop units. It also moves two air defense brigades and an armored cavalry regiment to new locations. The net result is the reduction of military spaces from 540,000 to 495,000, approximately 10 percent of today's force, by the end of fiscal year 1996.

The 10-division Army (Figure 9) consists of four light divisions and six heavy divisions, all stationed at existing installations. All divisions will consist of three active component brigades, increasing battlefield lethality and strategic responsiveness. They are augmented by two Armored Cavalry Regiments. Some divisions will have one brigade stationed at a different location. Restationing will maximize availability of training land for the active and reserve components, insure mutual support of collocated units, and enhance force projection capabilities.

Some division and subordinate unit designations are being changed following a review of lineage and honors by the Army's Center for Military History. The two division flags to leave the force will be those of the 2nd Armored Division and 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The **2AD** will be reflagged the 4th ID (Mechanized) and the 24th ID (Mechanized) will be reflagged the 3rd ID (Mechanized). The **1st** ID (Mechanized) flag will replace the 3rd ID (Mechanized) in Germany. The two brigades remaining at Fort Riley will align with the two divisions stationed in Germany. One brigade at Fort Carson will also inactivate. The brigade remaining at Fort Carson will operate under the command of the 4th ID (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, TX.

Additionally, two brigades, the 194th Armored Brigade (Separate) at Fort Knox, KY, and the

3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, will inactivate by the end of fiscal year 1995. The 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), will become the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division.

Although the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division, at Fort Richardson, AK, retains its unit designation, it will align with the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY, to serve as its third brigade. The overall force structure changes are designed to maximize worldwide power projection capability. Leaving a brigade in Alaska further reinforces a commitment to security and stability in the Pacific Rim.



Figure 9.

A reorganization of CONUSAs, the units that provide regional oversight for reserve forces training and mobilization, will occur in fiscal year 1995. The 1st Army at Fort Meade, MD, and the 6th Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA, will inactivate. Oversight of reserve units will consolidate under the remaining two CONUSA headquarters. The 2nd Army, at Fort Gillem, GA, will control reserve units in an area from Minnesota to Louisiana and eastward. The 5th Army, at Fort Sam Houston, TX, controls reserve units in the western portion of the country.

In fiscal year 1996, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, currently stationed at Fort Bliss, TX, moves to Fort Carson and shares the post with the brigade that remains there. Two air defense artillery brigades, the 108th at Fort Polk, LA, and the 31st at Fort Hood, will move to Fort Bliss.

Four corps headquarters will remain in the force structure: I Corps at Fort Lewis, **WA;** III Corps at Fort Hood, TX; V Corps in **Germany;** and XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, NC.

Three cavalry regiments will remain in the force structure: the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, **LA;** the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Carson, CO; and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, **CA** (OPFOR).

C. BRAC *95* FORCE STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (FISCAL YEAR 1996).

BRAC 95 FORCE STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

ARMY UNITS BY TYPE	ACTIVE	RESERVE
CORPS HEADQUARTERS	4	*0*
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	10	8
MANEUVER BRIGADES	30	48
ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS/LIGHT CAVALRY REGIMENTS	1/1	*110*
SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES GROUPS	5	2
SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES AVIATION GROUPS	1	0
FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS	51	83
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS	22	21
AVIATION BATTALIONS	54	46
ENGINEER BATTALIONS	39	87
SIGNAL BATTALIONS	44	35
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALIONS	29	13
RANGER REGIMENTS	1	*0*
OPPOSING FORCES (NATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS)	3	0

Figure 10.

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CHAPTER 3 - BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT SELECTION PROCESS

The Army's base closure and realignment process is consistent with applicable BRAC legislation and OSD guidance. It is driven by the Army's view of its long range requirements as expressed in the Army Stationing Strategy. This chapter provides an overview of those operational requirements and describes how the Army studied its installations.

Operational Requirements.

The strategic requirements outlined in the Bottom-Up Review translate directly into operational requirements that ensure the Army is trained and ready to support the National Military Strategy. Should the Army fail to satisfy these critical requirements, the nation's military strategy will be at risk. These requirements form the basis of the operational blueprint governing the stationing of Army forces. The operational requirements that significantly affect Army installations and readiness are outlined below.

Power Projection. Develop and maintain the capability to rapidly deploy and sustain decisive combat forces from bases in the United States to any region of the world.

Versatility. Maintain the capability to respond to a wide variety of missions, across the full range of military operations and environments; performing at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare while smoothly transitioning from one mission to another.

Strategic Agility. Develop and maintain the ability, through strategic mobility and stationing, to deploy and strike faster than a potential enemy.

Deterrence. Maintain sufficient global military capability to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain.

Training and Education. Maintain a high quality of combined, joint, and service specific training in both individual training conducted at institutional schools and collective training conducted at home station, major training areas, and Combat Training Centers.

Leader Development. Provide for the continuous professional development of Army leaders - a requirement paramount to achieving battlefield success with the minimum cost in terms of lives and resources.

Sustainment. Develop and maintain the ability to sustain large scale ground combat forces from bases in the nation's power projection strategy.

Technology Development. Maintain technological superiority to counterbalance potential adversaries, reduce risk, and enhance the potential for swift, decisive conflict termination.

Acquisition Excellence. Provide a flexible industrial base, capable of providing an uninterrupted flow of critical supplies, on short notice, without major retooling.

Force Generation. Size the operational and industrial base infrastructure to support force generation contingencies resulting from the requirements to conduct two, near-simultaneous, major regional conflicts.

Fiscal Responsibility. Adequately fund a balanced program of critical operational and infrastructure requirements, assisted by the reduction of infrastructure costs commensurate with the force drawdown.

Environmental Stewardship. Conserve environmental resources to ensure availability of training lands both now and in the future.

Quality of Life. Provide soldiers and their families a quality of life designed to attract and retain quality volunteers to man a modern, professional Army.

A. MANEUVER INSTALLATIONS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Maneuver installation category.

- Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- Fort Campbell, Kentucky
- Fort Carson, Colorado
- Fort Drum, New York
- Fort Hood, Texas
- Fort Lewis, Washington
- Fort Richardson, Alaska
- Fort Riley, Kansas
- Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
- Fort Stewart, Georgia
- Fort Wainwright, Alaska

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 11.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Maneuver installations are power projection platforms upon which our major combat forces are stationed. They provide facilities and resources to house, sustain, maintain, train, and deploy these forces. On a regional basis, maneuver installations also support both active and reserve activities that do not have immediate local access to required services and may be used as training and mobilization stations for the reserve force.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Maneuver installations, due to their size and flexibility, support the broadest array of operational requirements. In support of "power projection," these installations generate the majority of the Army's military power through trained and ready combat forces, and project that power using local transportation networks connected to national transportation assets.

The large land areas and range facilities associated with maneuver installations support the critical "training" requirement. At these installations, doctrinal education is put into practice and internalized at both individual and unit levels. The synergy of combined arms operations and the synchronized application of combat power can only be experienced through unit training.

The unsettled international security environment presents challenges across the entire spectrum of military operations. The Army's ability to respond to these challenges is a measure of the operational requirement of "versatility." Armored, light, airborne, air assault and special operations forces each play a vital role in maintaining the Army's versatility. The Army must, therefore, maintain this variety of units, each requiring access to a specific type of terrain or facilities, in order to respond to challenges across the entire continuum of military operations.

Reliance on these characteristics to support mobilization, as well as their ability to accommodate potential increases in force structure demonstrate maneuver installation support of the "force generation" requirement.

The remaining operational requirements, "deterrence" and "strategic agility" are supported by the location of the installation as well as other specific characteristics such as the servicing transportation network. In both cases, the ability to position large combat units relative to evolving international situations is uniquely characteristic of this category of installations and vital to the National Military Strategy. Because of their proximity to the region, forces stationed in Alaska and Hawaii best support these operational requirements with respect to the Pacific Region. Such stationing sends a clear message to both allies and potential adversaries alike, that the United States intends to remain actively engaged in this vital region of the world. Beyond that, deployment times to potential hot spots throughout the region are minimized by the reduced distances.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain the capability to station 10 division equivalents (30 maneuver brigades) and 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) in the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) along with the "echelons above division" command and control and support force structure as outlined in the Bottom Up Review.

(2) Leverage deterrent and crisis response by maintaining forward presence through forces stationed in Hawaii and Alaska.

(3) Maintain the capability to station three corps headquarters with support elements in the United States.

(4) Station armored forces in the western United States to facilitate power projection to the Pacific theater.

(5) Facilitate power projection of assigned units.

(6) Provide the ability to train tenant units and ensure their readiness

(7) Ensure sufficient land and range facilities are available to support mobilization and training requirements of the reserve components.

(8) Provide sufficient training land and range facilities to support joint and combined training exercises.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

The current maneuver installation structure accommodates the size and composition of the force (as established by the Bottom Up Review), includes sufficient land and facilities to support a trained and ready force, and provides adequate flexibility to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.

Within the continental United States (CONUS), maneuver installations with certain unique characteristics are operationally crucial to the National Military Strategy and must be retained. These unique characteristics include the capability to support two division-size units, close proximity to large port facilities, and special facilities designed to support unique military capabilities such as airborne or air assault units. Unique facilities at Fort Bragg (airborne/special operations) and Fort Campbell (air assault), joint operations at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base (providing rapid deployability), immediate access to large port facilities from Fort Stewart and Fort Lewis (providing rapid deployability), and operational synergies and efficiencies resulting from collocation of large maneuver forces at Fort Hood, all provide operational capabilities unique to those installations and critical to the Army's warfighting mission.

In order to support USCINCPAC strategy in the Pacific Theater, the Army must maintain a credible force stationed in Alaska and Hawaii. Installations there provide the unique opportunity to accomplish this forward presence while stationing forces within the United States. In addition to reinforcing our long-standing regional relationships, forces stationed in Alaska and Hawaii present clear evidence of American commitment in the Pacific Theater - assuring our allies and deterring potential adversaries. Operationally, these forces provide the requisite warfighting capability for immediate USCINCPAC use; support forward presence, contingency, and combat operations; contribute significantly to joint interoperability; and are positioned to rapidly deploy in support of regional contingencies. As the force structure in Alaska is downsized from a maneuver division to a maneuver brigade with associated support elements, the installation structure can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the current force structure. Flexibility to meet future contingencies should, however, be maintained by placing any excess infrastructure in layaway status. Such action will preserve the land for future training purposes while reducing the rate of facility deterioration, allowing cost-effective use of the buildings in the future.

As the post Cold War international security environment continues to evolve, the Army must retain the stationing flexibility to respond to these changes. Major unit relocations could be prompted by such changes. As a major component of strategic agility, unit locations may need to be changed as security threats evolve in different areas of the world. Similarly, changes in the international security environment may reduce the need for forward presence. In either case, as long as the National Military Strategy includes the requirement to fight and win two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts, the Army requires a 10 division force (as determined by the Bottom Up Review). Whether stationed overseas or in the United States, the location of the force does not alter the force structure required to generate decisive victory. The Army must retain the flexibility to locate these units in the United States.

Should the Army fail to maintain the maneuver installation structure required to accommodate these scenarios, implementation of future stationing decisions may not be possible without the expenditure of billions of dollars and considerable delay. The international security environment is subject to change. The Army must retain the stationing flexibility necessary to respond in support of the National Military Strategy. The nation can ill afford the risk of allowing near-term installation structure decisions to dictate future force structure/stationing decisions.

The table below outlines the capacity of existing maneuver installations (in terms of maneuver brigades only), and the potential capacity of these installations achievable through a significant investment in new construction.

Note: This simplified analysis is intended to demonstrate the thought process and is not intended to substitute for a detailed, formal capacity analysis. Additionally, it does not consider the stationing requirements generated by the substantial number of additional, non-brigade forces currently stationed both in the United States and abroad.

CAPACITY REQUIREMENT TO STATION BOTTOM UP REVIEW FORCE
(19 Mechanized Brigades and 13 Light Brigades)

INSTALLATION	WITHOUT CONSTRUCTION	WITH CONSTRUCTION
Bragg	3*	3*
Campbell	3*	3*
Carson	2	3
Drum	2*	3*
Hood	5	5
Lewis	2	3
Richardson	1*	1*
Riley	2	2
Stewart	2	2
Wainwright	1*	2*
Schofield Barracks	3*	3*
Benning	1	1
Bliss	1	4
Knox	-	1
Polk	1*	2*
Total	15/14*	21/17*

* light forces only

Currently, **24** maneuver brigades (12 mechanized and **12** light) and 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) (1 mechanized and 1 light) are stationed in the United States As shown in the table above, current installation capacity can accommodate **29** brigades (15 mechanized and 14 light) without additional construction. This is less capacity than required to station the force in the United States (19 mechanized brigades/ACRs and 13 light brigades/ACRs). **Any** further reduction in the Army's ability to station tactical forces in the United States creates excessive operational **risk** and carries with it, the potential for future expenditures (facility construction and land acquisition) far in excess of savings achieved through base closure.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The MVA provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 12.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Fort Bragg is home to XVIII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Corps Support Command, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Special Operations Command, and a number of other units and activities. The 82nd Airborne Division is a member of the Contingency Force Pool, as are many other Fort Bragg units. Additionally, the proximity of Pope Air Force Base provides Fort Bragg with immediate access to strategic *airlift.* Because of its high military value, Fort Bragg was not selected for further study.

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Fort Campbell is home to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and the 160th Special Operations Regiment. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is a member of the Contingency Force Pool. Because of its high military value, Fort Campbell was not selected for further study.

Fort Carson, Colorado

Fort Carson is currently home to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and future home of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). **As** a result of recent reflagging decisions, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) will inactivate its Fort Carson headquarters and activate at Fort Hood, TX, replacing the 2nd Armored Division. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment will move to Carson from Fort Bliss. One divisional brigade remains at Carson, assigned as an element of the 4th ID (Mechanized). Because of its high military value, it was not selected for hrther study

Fort Drum, New York

Fort Drum is home to the 10th Infantry Division (Light). The 10th Division is retained under the Force Structure Plan and is a member of the Contingency Force Pool. The post is a primary mobilization station for upward to 50,000 Reserve Component soldiers. Because of its lesser military value, Fort Drum was selected for additional study. Due to the overall importance of maneuver installations to station and train ground forces and the **high** costs associated with closure, the Army decided that Fort Drum should remain open.

Fort Hood, Texas

Fort Hood is currently home to III Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Armored Division, and five separate brigades. The 2nd Armored Division is scheduled to be reflagged as the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 1st Cavalry Division is retained and is a member of the Contingency Force Pool. Because of its **high** military value, Fort Hood was not selected for further study.

Fort Lewis, Washington

Fort Lewis is home to I *Corps,* one light infantry brigade, one heavy brigade and numerous non-divisional units. Under the force structure plan, the light brigade will be aligned with the 25th Infantry Division **(Hawaii),** and the heavy brigade with the 2nd Infantry Division (Korea). Because of its high **military** value, Fort Lewis **was** not selected for further study.

Fort Richardson, Alaska

Fort Richardson, along with Fort Wainwright, supports 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) and the Arctic Support Brigade. Under the Force Structure Plan, these units will be

aligned with the 10th Infantry Division (Fort Drum). Because of its lesser military value, Fort Richardson was selected for additional study. Due to strategic requirements for presence in the Pacific region and the high costs associated with closure, the Army decided that Fort Richardson should remain open.

Fort Riley, Kansas

Fort Riley is currently home to the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) will inactivate its Fort Riley headquarters and activate in Germany replacing the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). Two heavy brigades will remain at Fort Riley as reinforcing brigades for divisions stationed in Europe. Because of Fort Riley's lesser military value, it was selected for further study. Due to the overall importance of maneuver installations to station and train ground forces and the high costs associated with closure, the Army decided to keep Fort Riley open.

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Schofield Barracks is the home to the 25th Infantry Division (Light). Under the Force Structure Plan, one brigade will inactivate. The post's location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean gives the U.S. Army a strategic position in the Pacific Theater. Although Schofield Barracks ranked relatively low in the installation assessment, it meets a specific requirement to maintain forward deployed forces in Hawaii for crisis response and therefore ranks high in **military** value. Accordingly, it was not selected for further study.

Fort Stewart, Georgia

Fort Stewart is currently home to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 24th Division (Mechanized) is a member of the Contingency Force Pool and is scheduled to be reflagged as the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). Hunter Army Airfield, Fort Stewart's satellite installation, is the home to 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (Airborne) and 3rd Battalion, 160th Aviation (Special Operations Forces). Due to its proximity to port, rail and C5-capable airfield facilities, Fort Stewart is the model for rapid deployment of a heavy division. Because of Fort Stewart's high military value, it **was** not selected for further study.

Fort Wainwright, Alaska

Fort Wainwright, along with Fort Richardson, supports the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) and the Arctic Support Brigade. Its lower **military** value assessment made it a candidate for further study. Due to strategic requirements for presence in the Pacific region and the high costs associated with closure, the Army decided that Fort Wainwright should remain open. The Army recommends relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) from Fort Greely to Fort Wainwright.

B. MAJOR TRAINING AREAS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Major Training Area category

- Fort **A.P.** Hill, Virginia
- Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
- Fort Dix, New Jersey
- Fort Greely, Alaska
- Fort Hunter Liggett, California
- Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
- Fort Irwin, California
- Fort McCoy, Wisconsin
- Fort Pickett, Virginia
- Fort Polk, Louisiana

The following **map** shows the geographic location of each installation.

Figure 13.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Major training areas provide facilities to active and reserve components for large unit training exercises. With the exceptions of the Combat Training Centers located at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, few active tactical units are stationed at these locations, which vary in characteristics, capabilities, and organization.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Major training areas primarily support the collective component of the "training" requirement. The Combat Training Centers provide state-of-the-art training, while other installations in this category serve as training areas for reserve component forces. These installations not only support sustainment training, but as major components of our mobilization strategy, they also support the "force generation" requirement by serving as mobilization stations and locations for major unit training of mobilized reserve component forces.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain Combat Training Centers for both armored and light forces.

(2) Retain sufficient training acreage and range facilities to meet current and potential needs of both the active and priority reserve component forces (Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades).

(3) Minimize the number of major training areas focused primarily on reserve component training support.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Combat Training Centers (CTC) are one of the **primary** reasons the Army was able to recover from the era of "hollowness" that developed during the **1970's.** Installations supporting these Combat Training Centers must be retained **to** insure continued support for this vital component of readiness.

Major training areas that support reserve components should be realigned to accomplish the mission in the most cost effective manner. **AS** field training is the focus, cantonment areas can be minimized by eliminating all functions other than those required **to** support unit training in a field environment. Additionally, installations where the workload reasonably can be relocated to other installations may be closed with minimal impact on operational requirements. Priority of training support will go to Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 14.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia

Fort **AP.** Hill provides training, administrative, and logistical support for Reserve Component (RC) units, Active Component units, other military departments and government agencies; however, Fort **A.P.** Hill's primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on Reserve Component (RC) training support. *As* a result, Fort **A.P.** Hill was chosen as a candidate for further study. The **Army** decided that closure is operationally infeasible due to the annual training requirements of the RC.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Fort Chaffee serves as a major training area for Active and Reserve Component soldiers as well as service members from other military departments and civilian agencies. Further, Fort Chaffee has served as a site for contingency missions, including Vietnamese and Cuban Resettlement Programs. Fort Chaffee's primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Consequently, Fort Chaffee was chosen as a candidate for study. The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, except for a Reserve Component enclave

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Fort Dix provides command and control to the New York Area Command at Fort Hamilton and Fort Totten as well as functional support to the New York Maintenance Shop Bellmore; Camp Kilmer, NJ; and Camp Pedricktown, NJ. The garrison is postured to support Active and Reserve Component training; however, its primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Therefore, Fort Dix was chosen as a candidate for study The Army recommends realigning Fort Dix.

Fort Greely, Alaska

Fort Greely manages over 662,000 acres of training areas used by Army and Air Force units, the Cold Regions Test Center, and The Northern Warfare Training Center. The Army Stationing Strategy indicates that the number of major training areas should be reduced if operational requirements permit. As a result, Fort Greely was chosen as a candidate for further study The Army recommends realigning Fort Greely.

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

Fort Indiantown Gap is a major Reserve Component (RC) training center for ground and air units. It is also the home of Headquarters, Pennsylvania National Guard. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Accordingly, Fort Indiantown Gap was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Indiantown Gap, except for a reserve component enclave.

Fort Hunter Liggett, California

Fort Hunter Liggett's primary mission is to support RC units. It is the major maneuver area for combined arms training of the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), California Army National Guard. It is also the home to the Test and Experimentation Center which conducts field equipment testing for the U.S. Army. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to

reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. As a result, Fort Hunter Liggett was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends realigning Fort Hunter Liggett.

Fort Irwin, California

Fort Irwin is the home to the National Training Center (NTC). The NTC's mission is to provide tough, realistic combined arms and services joint training in accordance with operations doctrine for brigades and regiments in a mid-to-high intensity environment. In addition, the NTC provides lessons learned for training, doctrine, and equipment improvements. As one of two COWS-based Combat Training Centers, Fort Irwin plays a key role in maintaining Army readiness. Therefore, it was not selected for further study.

Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

Fort McCoy's primary mission is to provide training for the readiness of RC forces. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. As a result, Fort McCoy was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army decided that closure is operationally infeasible due to the training requirements of the RC.

Fort Pickett, Virginia

Fort Pickett's primary mission is to provide training facilities, maneuver training areas, base operations, and mobilization support to Reserve Component units, as well as the Active Component and other services. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on reserve component training support. As a result, Fort Pickett was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Pickett, except for a reserve component enclave.

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Fort Polk is the home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The JRTC provides tough, realistic, light infantry and joint services training in accordance with operational doctrine for low to mid-to-high intensity environments. In addition, the JRTC provides lessons learned for training, doctrine, and equipment improvements. Fort Polk also supports the 2nd ACR and other contingency force units supporting XVIII Airborne Corps. As one of two COWS-based Combat Training Centers, Fort Polk plays a key role in maintaining Army readiness. Therefore, it was not selected for further study.

C. COMMAND AND CONTROL/ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Command and Control Category

- Fort Belvoir, Virginia
- Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
- Fort Gillem, Georgia
- Fort Hamilton, New **York**
- Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
- Fort McPherson, Georgia
- Fort Meade, Maryland
- Fort Monroe, Virginia
- Fort Myer, Virginia
- Presidio of San Francisco, California
- Price Support Center, Illinois
- Fort Ritchie, Maryland
- Fort Shafter, Hawaii
- TACOM Support Activity, Selfridge, Michigan
- Fort Totten, New York

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 15.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Installations in this category provide facilities through which the Army leadership commands, controls, and manages the systems that generate combat and sustaining forces. Major Army Command (MACOM) headquarters such as Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), provide command and control over units and organizations which are functionally organized to perform a specific mission. These headquarters, like other command and control organizations, require ready access to modern communications facilities in order to efficiently exercise their command and control functions. Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters are critical to the mobilization and deployment of reserve component forces. They are regionally oriented to facilitate their mission. The field army headquarters must be stationed with ready access to other joint headquarters and have the ability to rapidly deploy in the event of a crisis. Army Force (ARFOR) command and control

headquarters locations are primarily dictated by the location of the supported joint headquarters. Joint planning activities, reliable communications, and rapid deployment capability all influence the positioning of these elements. In addition to these command and control functions, many of these installations primarily provide housing and quality of life services to soldiers and their families.

(b) Operational Requirements.

The functions accomplished at these installations support the entire range of operational requirements. Command, control, management., and integration functions generate decisions significantly affecting support for both current and future operational requirements. Without these functions, the Army could not exist as a viable organization.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain the capability to station one field army headquarters, a minimum of two Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters, all major army command (MACOM) headquarters, and a United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) headquarters in the United States.

(2) Facilitate ARFOR command and control for regionally-oriented, US-based, unified commands and the Special Operations Command.

(3) Maintain installations for the sole purpose of providing family housing and other quality of life functions only where fiscally advantageous.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

The high operational value of many of these installations is derived from the installations unique geographic location and the nature of their support to the mission requirements of tenant units. In these cases, the installations should be :retained. Included in this group are Fort Myer, and Fort Belvoir.

Fort Myer is uniquely located to provide immediate support to the Pentagon, Arlington National Cemetery, and other key facilities in the nation's capital. The missions associated with units stationed at Fort Myer cannot be satisfactorily accomplished from another installation.

In addition to housing several key organizations, Fort Belvoir provides the Army the opportunity to relocate organizations from leased facilities in the National Capital Region to federally owned property.

TRADOC Headquarters should be stationed in the joint environment of the Tidewater Region to allow immediate access to doctrine development processes of other Services as well as Joint organizations stationed at Fort Monroe and in the region.

In cases where an installation exists solely to provide quality of life functions for forces stationed in the immediate area, closure should be considered only when similar quality of life can be provided through a less costly alternative.

In most situations, current stationing is not vital to successful mission accomplishment of tenant units. Any closure recommendations should, however, carefully consider operational requirements when considering relocation options.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The Army Stationing Strategy The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 16.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Fort Belvoir is located in the National Capital Region (NCR) and is one of two larger installations available to the Army for expansion in the area It provides essential logistical and administrative support to **78** tenant organizations as well as support services on an area basis to a substantial number of satellite activities throughout the greater Washington D **C.** area Included are **38** elements or headquarters of 9 Army MACOMs. Major DoD tenants currently located on Fort Belvoir include the Defense Systems Management College, the Defense Mapping School of the Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Communications-ElectronicsEvaluation & Testing Activity. Other DoD agencies scheduled to move to Fort Belvoir after mid-1995 include the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Technical Information Service, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense National Stockpile Center, Defense Fuel Supply Center, and the Defense Supply Services-Washington. **As** a result of its high military value.,Fort Belvoir was not selected for further study.

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico

Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, is the only Active Army installation in the Caribbean, and is located six miles southeast of metropolitan San Juan, Puerto Rico. Fort Buchanan is a mobilization station and serves as the coordinating and supporting installation for Reserve Component units in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Fort Buchanan was selected for further study because of its relatively low military value. The Army recommends realigning this installation.

Fort Gillem, Georgia

Fort Gillem, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, is located in the same metropolitan area as Fort McPherson. It provides services to the numerous tenant organizations at Fort McPherson and Gillem as well **as** a number of satellite activities in the Atlanta area. Tenants include the 2nd U.S. Army, the Army/Air Force Exchange Regional Distribution Center, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory. In addition, Fort Gillem provides general administrative and warehouse space for HQ, FORSCOM, 3rd U.S. Army and the Fort McPherson Garrison. These facilities are required to supplement a space deficit. Because of its relatively low military value, Fort Gillem was selected for further study. The 1993 Commission considered Fort Gillem as a potential addition to DoD's list but ultimately concluded it should remain open. The Army's study in BRAC 95 confirmed the validity of that decision. The **Army** discontinued study due to the operational support it provides to Fort McPherson and the high costs associated with closing Fort Gillem.

Fort Hamilton, New York

Fort Hamilton, a sub-installation of Fort Dix, is located in New York City's Borough of Brooklyn and supports the operations of the New York Area Command (NYAC). This post is the administrative center for Army activities in the New York. metropolitan area and provides the full range of support to active duty military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and military retirees. Because of its low military value, Fort Hamilton was selected for further study The Army recommends realigning Fort Hamilton.

Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania

Kelly Support Center is located in southwestern Pennsylvania, 12 miles southwest of Pittsburgh. It supports the 99th U.S. Army Reserve Command and a variety of satellite activities in the area. Since the Kelly Support Center provides minimal active duty support, it was selected for further study. The Army recommends realigning this installation.

Fort McPherson, Georgia

Fort McPherson is located in East Point, Georgia, within the metropolitan area of Atlanta, eight miles from Hartsfield International Airport. Fort McPherson provides base operations support to numerous tenant organizations at Fort McPherson and its two sub-installations, Fort Gillem in Forest Park, Georgia, and Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico as well as area support to a number of satellite activities. Tenants include Forces Command and HQ, Third U.S. Army. HQ, U.S. Army Reserve Command is scheduled to move to Fort McPherson from leased facilities in Atlanta in the near future. In view of this high military value, Fort McPherson was not selected for further study.

Fort Meade, Maryland

Fort Meade is located approximately 20 miles north of Washington, D.C. It provides base operations support to several intelligence activities and other tenants, including the National Security Agency. The current Force Structure Plan eliminates one of Fort Meade's primary tenants, the First U.S. Army Headquarters. In addition, as a result of a BRAC 91 recommendation, the Defense Information School will relocate to Fort Meade. Because of Fort Meade's large non-DoD population, it was selected for further study. Due to the high costs associated with closure and the importance of the installation to the National Capital Region, the Army decided to keep Fort Meade open. The Army recommends downsizing the hospital to a clinic, in accordance with the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group's recommendation.

Fort Monroe, Virginia

Fort Monroe is located in the Norfolk/Newport News area of southeastern Virginia. The post supports HQ, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army Cadet Command, and the Joint Warfare Fighting Center. Other tenants include the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Mobility Concepts Agency (MCA). The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes that TRADOC Headquarters should be stationed in the joint environment of the Tidewater Region to allow immediate access to doctrine development agencies of other Services as well as joint organizations stationed in the region. With this in mind, Fort Monroe was recommended for further study. The 1993 Commission added Fort Monroe to the list of closure candidates and concluded it should remain open. The Army's study reaffirmed this conclusion and concluded Fort Monroe is well-suited and well-situated to meet its mission. In the military judgment of the Army, Fort Monroe should remain open.

Fort Myer, Virginia

Fort Myer is located in Arlington, Virginia and provides command, control, and operations support to various tenants as well as two sub-installations: Fort McNair and Cameron Station (scheduled to close in 1996). In addition, it provides base operations support to other Army and Department of Defense organizations within the National Capital Region and Military District of Washington. The post directly supports the operation of Arlington National Cemetery and extensive protocol requirements in the Washington D.C. area. Fort Myer is uniquely located to provide immediate support to the Pentagon, Arlington National Cemetery, and other key facilities in the nations' capital. Therefore, it was not selected for fbrther study.

Presidio of San Francisco (PSF), California

The Presidio of San Francisco is located within the boundaries of the City of San Francisco. It has provided support to Headquarters, Sixth U. S. Army, which inactivates under the Force Structure Plan. The 1993 Commission modified the 1988 Commission's recommendation to close the installation by allowing the Sixth Army Headquarters to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco. In 1994, the installation was turned over to the U.S. Park Service. Therefore, the Army discontinued fbrther study of this installation.

Price Support Center, Illinois

Price Support Center is located in southern Illinois near Granite City. It provides administrative, and logistical support to multiple agencies through Inter/Intra/Service Support Agreements (ISSAs). Primary tenants include the HQ Aviation Troop Command Support Element and the VA Records Processing Center. Price Support Center supports a relatively small number of Army military personnel in the area; therefore, it was selected for fbrther study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Fort Ritchie is located in western Maryland, approximately 70 miles northwest of Washington, D.C. and supports the Alternate Joint Communications Center and the National Miliary Command Center (Site R). Its major tenants are Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS, the Defense Information Services Organization, and various Information Systems Command elements. Because of its relatively low military value, Fort Ritchie was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Ritchie.

Fort Shafter, Hawaii

Fort Shafter is located on the island of Oahu, approximately **5** miles from Honolulu, Hawaii. It is the home of HQ, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army component of U.S. Commander In Chief, Pacific Command. In addition, it provides base support to **39** tenant activities and 12 satellite activities, including the Corps of Engineers, Pacific Ocean Division and the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii. Because of these essential stationing requirements, Fort Shafter was not selected for further study.

Tank Automotive Command (TACOMSA), Selfridge, Michigan

Tank Automotive Command Support Activity (TACOMSA) is located on Selfridge Air National Guard Base, 20 miles north of Detroit and provides installation and logistical support to TACOM and a number of Reserve Component activities. As the major Army component on a multi-service base, it occupies or is responsible for 622 acres within the 3,600 acre base. In all, approximately 100 industrial buildings and 965 family housing units are managed by TACOMSA. Selfridge supports a small Army military population. Because of its relatively low military value, is was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Fort Totten, New York

Fort Totten is located in New York City's Borough of Queens, and is a sub-installation of Fort Hamilton. Its mission is to provide housing and quality of life support to active duty military personnel of **all** services residing in the area. Fort Totten is host **to** a variety of civilian organizations and the Headquarters of the 77th U.S. **Army** Reserve Command, one of the largest reserve commands in the Army. Fort Totten possesses no unique operational stationing requirements; therefore, it was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Totten and retaining an enclave for the **U.S. Army** Reserve.

D. TRAINING SCHOOLS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Training School Category.

- Fort Benning, Georgia
- Fort Bliss, Texas
- Fort Eustis and Fort Story, **Virginia**
- Fort Gordon, Georgia
- Fort Huachuca, Arizona
- Fort Jackson, South Carolina
- Fort Knox, Kentucky
- Fort Lee, Virginia
- Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
- Fort McClellan, Alabama
- Presidio of Monterey
- Fort Rucker, Alabama
- Fort Sam Houston, Texas
- Fort Sill, Oklahoma

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation



Figure 17.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Training installations provide a home for the institutional component of the Army's training system. The functions the Army must perform on the battlefield are encompassed by the Army's branches which are housed on these posts. At the foundation of each branch, is a school where the branch's doctrine is written, functional training takes place, leader development accomplished, warfighting organizations designed, and modernization requirements developed. These posts also provide space for initial entry training where civilians begin the soldierization process. Additionally, these installations house schools that provide specialized training, such as language training.

These schools represent a training system unique among the military services. This system has evolved and matured over time. It is the foundation for the nation's land warfare university and, as such, represents a national resource.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Training schools support the "training and education" requirement. Schools and training centers located on these installations focus on the individual combat and functional skills a soldier requires to be effective on the battlefield. In doing so, they provide tactical units with the foundation needed to achieve successful collective training. The schools on these installations combine classroom education, state of the *art* simulations, and hands on field training to produce soldiers capable of functioning in today's technologically complex Army. Without successful individual training, combat units cannot achieve the level of collective training required to maintain readiness.

The operational requirement of "leader development" for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers is also conducted at training installations. They provide our noncommissioned officer corps with opportunities to expand their leadership skills and learn advanced technical skills associated with their military occupational specialty. Similarly, an officer's basic and advanced military skills are developed at the branch schools located on training installations.

A companion to "leader development," the operational requirement of "versatility" is, in part, a product of the flexibility and adaptability of military leaders at **all** levels. The Army's training and education programs train our soldiers in the skills required to successfully lead our forces in an ever expanding variety of difficult missions.

Finally, training schools must retain the capability for accommodating fluctuations in the student workload in support of the "force generation" requirement. In times of conflict, these schools provide refresher training for mobilized individual reservists and must meet the needs of an expanding force. In this role, training schools also support the operational requirement of "sustainment." By training individual soldiers, they sustain the strength of deployed forces through a steady flow of trained replacements.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Retain a branch school for each branch.

(2) Locate branch schools to facilitate combined arms training and operational efficiency

(3) Consolidate basic training, advanced individual training, and one station unit training to accomplish the mission in the most efficient manner.

(4) Ensure that the entire range of military skills can be trained.

(5) Provide sufficient area (land, airspace, and water) with proper facilities to adequately support training, combat development, and doctrine development.

(6) Maintain the capability to support "logistics over the shore" training.

(7) Maintain a training capacity sized to support the peacetime operational and sustainment needs of the force (both active and reserve).

(8) Provide adequate training airspace and facilities to support rotary wing pilot training

(9) Provide adequate facilities to establish and support a single ROTC Summer Camp

(d) Operational Blueprint.

The ongoing reshaping of the force and concurrent drawdown affects the workload on training installations. However, not all trends indicate a decrease in student workloads. For example, beginning in 1997, Army accessions are projected to increase from 70,000 to 90,000 per year. This increase in accessions will result in significantlyhigher student workloads in Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, and many other related schools. Additionally, the continued growth of joint and combined force warfighting doctrine will increase the training requirement at selected training schools. As a result of these and other fluctuations in student workload, little excess facility capacity will be created. Changes in the training base workload are often the result of influences beyond the control of the training community (i.e., international environment, personnel policy decisions, new courses resulting from technological developments, etc.). Such changes do not afford the training schools time or resources to construct additional training capacity. Therefore, infrastructure savings in this category must result from the relocation of an existing institution, not its inactivation.

As the Army approaches "steady state," opportunities will, however, exist to consolidate functionally similar training schools on fewer, high capacity, modernized installations. Such consolidation is intended to facilitate the integration of leader development, functional training, doctrine writing, and combat development for branches that support a common battlefield operating system.

From an operational standpoint, certain consolidations initially suggest themselves. Finally, consolidate basic combat training at fewer locations consistent with the projected training workload.

School consolidation should allow closure of installations. However, training schools are facility intensive, making such consolidation extremely expensive, as no installation is currently structured to receive another institution without significant new construction. Additionally, training school relocation creates tremendous turmoil throughout the force. When combined with the trauma of the drawdown, the continuity and readiness of the Army could be threatened by an overly aggressive restructuring of training schools. While the temptation exists to redesign the entire school system at once, the Army cannot withstand the financial and destabilizing effects of

such a grand realignment. By focusing on the recommended options, both costs and turmoil can be adequately contained while achieving the operational benefits of warfighting centers and reaping base closure savings.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The **MVA** integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The **Army** Stationing Strategy. The result is the Amy's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 18.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fort Benning, Georgia

Fort Benning **is** home to the U.S. Army Infantry School; School of Americas; 75th Ranger Regiment headquarters; 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers; and three FORSCOM deployable units (3rd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division; 36th Engineer Group and the 988th Military Police Company).

Fort Benning is a large installation with approximately 182,000 acres or 284 square miles. As a major training base, it has extensive range complexes and maneuver space. Because of its high military value, Fort Benning was not selected for fbrther study.

Fort Bliss, Texas

Fort Bliss is the home to the Air Defense Artillery School, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, and various deployable FORSCOM units including the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) and the 1lth Air Defense Artillery Brigade. The Force Structure Plan moves the 3rd ACR to Fort Carson. Fort Bliss is backfilled with two Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigades, creating an ADA Center of Excellence. Because of its high military value, Fort Bliss was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating the missions and functions of the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center from Fort Hunter Liggett to Fort Bliss.

Fort Eustis **and Fort** Story, **Virginia**

Fort Eustis and its subpost, Fort Story, are home to the Transportation School, Aviation Logistics School, and the 7th Transportation Group. Fort Eustis possesses unique port facilities not found at other Army installations. Fort Story has the Army's only over-the-shore training site. Despite these special capabilities, Fort Eustis and Fort Story were rated relatively low in military value when compared to like installations. Accordingly, Forts Eustis/Story were selected for further study. Due to the high costs associated with closure, the Army decided to keep these installations open.

Fort Gordon, Georgia

Fort Gordon is home to the Army Signal School and the National Science Center for Communications and Electronics. Fort Gordon recently received a Military Intelligence Brigade from Fort Monmouth. Because of its high military value, Fort Gordon was not selected for fbrther study.

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Fort Huachuca is home to the Intelligence School and Center; HQ, US Army Information Systems Command; the Electronic Proving Grounds; the 1lth Signal Brigade; and various other tenants. Intelligence School activities at Fort Devens are being consolidated with the Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca as the result of a decision by the 1988 Commission. HQ, Information Systems Command remained at Fort Huachuca as a result of a decision by the 1991 Commission. Fort Huachuca provides a unique electromagnetic-free environment for test and evaluation of communications and electronic systems training and testing of intelligence and electronic warfare systems. Because of its high military value, it was not selected for fbrther study.

Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Fort Jackson's current mission is initial entry training. It trains about one half of the Army's basic training soldiers and represents a significant capability to accept rapid growth in basic training under emergency conditions. In FY 95, the Soldier Support Warfighting Center will be established there. As a result of a decision by the 1991 Commission to close Fort Benjamin Harrison, the Adjutant General School, Finance School, the Recruiting and Retention School, and the Noncommissioned Officers Academy will move to Fort Jackson. The 1993 Commission relocated the Chaplain School from Fort Monmouth to Fort Jackson. Additionally, the 1988 Commission moved some basic and advanced individual training from various locations to Fort Jackson. Because of its military value, it was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating the DoD Polygraph Institute from Fort McClellan to Fort Jackson

Fort Knox, Kentucky

Fort Knox is home to the Army's Armor School and the US Army Recruiting Command The 194th Armored Brigade, currently located at Fort Knox, will inactivate as a result of the Force Structure Plan. The post possesses numerous armor and mechanized training simulation facilities Because of its high military value, it was not selected for further study.

Fort Lee, Virginia

Fort Lee is home to the Army's Quartermaster School, Army Logistics Center, Army Logistics Management College, and the Defense Commissary Agency. The Inter-Service Training Review Organization (ITRO) selected Fort Lee as the site for multi-service Food Service Training. Fort Lee was selected as a study candidate in order to review consolidation of various combat service support functions. Due to the high costs associated with closure, the Army reaffirmed the conclusion of the 1993 Commission and decided to keep Fort Lee open. The Army recommends downsizing the hospital to a clinic in accordance: with the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group's recommendation.

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Fort Leonard Wood is the home to the Engineer School and numerous engineer units DoD's Inter-Service Training Review Organization (ITRO) recently designated Fort Leonard Wood for consolidation of multi-service Engineer training. Fort Leonard Wood was selected as a study candidate in order to review consolidation/collocation of the Engineer, Chemical, and Military Police schools. Due to the high costs and adverse operational impacts associated with closure, the Army decided to retain this installation. The Army recommends relocating the Chemical and Military Police schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Fort McClellan is home to the Chemical and Military Police Schools and the DoD Polygraph Institute. It is the smallest school installation in terms of population and facilities. DoD submitted recommendations to close Fort McClellan to the 1991 and 1993 Commissions. It was again selected for further study in order to review creation of a Mobility/Survivability Center. The Army recommends closing Fort McClellan, except for a reserve component enclave.

Presidio of Monterey, California

The Presidio of Monterey (POM) is home to the Defense :Language Institute (DLI). It was selected as a study candidate to assess the feasibility of collocating DLI where follow-on training is done. Because of the high cost associated with closure, the Army discontinued further study.

Fort Rucker, Alabama

Fort Rucker is the home to the Army Aviation School and the Army Safety Center. As a major training base, it possesses extensive range facilities and air space. Because of its large available air space and its high military value, Fort Rucker was not selected for further study

Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Fort Sam Houston is home to the Academy of Health Sciences which trains soldiers in medical skills and provides professional development training for medical and Medical Service Corps personnel. Because of its high military value, it was not selected for further study.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Fort Sill is home to the Army's Field Artillery School and a number of deployable Field Artillery units. As a major training base, it possesses extensive ranges, impact areas, and maneuver space. Because of its high military value, it was not selected for further study.

E. PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Professional Schools installation category.

- Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
- Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
- Fort Leslie McNair, Washington D.C.
- United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

The following map shows the geographic distribution of each installation



Figure *19.*

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Professional education institutions provide professional military education for officers and Department of the Army civilian employees. This education is the combat multiplier that separates the United States Army from all others and provides the intellectual basis upon which the future of the Army will be built. Each facility provides an academic environment geared to a specific level of professional military education. Officer professional education ranges from the tactical level at the **US** Military Academy at West Point, through the operational level at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and culminates at the strategic level in the senior service colleges at Fort McNair and Carlisle Barracks

(b) Operational Requirements.

These primarily academic installations support the operational requirement of "leader development." The professional education received at these installations develop the competent leaders that are critical to success on the modem battlefield. As one of the six imperatives for a trained and ready force, leader development enables the Army to remain the world's premier land combat force without having to be the largest.

The operational requirement of "versatility" is, in part, a product of the flexibility and adaptability of military leaders at all levels. The Army's educational programs embed in our soldiers, the skills required to successfully lead our forces in an ever expanding variety of difficult missions.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Meet the Army's requirements for trained, professional leaders.

(2) Maintain the unique characteristic of each academic level (tactical, operational, and strategic).

(3) Maintain educational capacity to support the peacetime needs of the force and the flexibility to respond to significant fluctuations in student workload.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

For most of our Army's history, these academic institutions have formed the professional foundation upon which our Army is built. This vital function must continue if we are to sustain a professional Army. The current force drawdown may affect student workloads at these institutions, but not to the extent that such excess facility capacity is created as to warrant realignment of the institutions or closure of the installations.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment **(MVA)** was conducted for each installation category The **MVA** integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The MVA reaffirmed the military value of each academic institution.



Figure 20.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Carlisle Barracks is home to the Army's War College. Because of its unique capability and **high** military value, it **was** not selected for further study.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Fort Leavenworth is home to the Army's Command and General Staff College and United States Disciplinary Barracks. Because of its unique capability and high military value, it was not selected for fbrther study.

Fort Leslie McNair, Washington D.C.

Fort McNair is home to the National Defense University, which includes the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Because of its unique capability and high military value, it was not selected for fkrther study.

United States Military Academy, New York

West Point is a special, one-of-a-kind installation, whose purpose is to provide quality academic, military, and physical development of this nation's future military leaders. The main post area is designated as a National Register of Historical Places site. Because of its unique capability and high military value, it was not selected for fkrther study.

F. AMMUNITION PRODUCTION.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Ammunition Production installation category:

- Holston **Army** Ammunition Plant, Tennessee
- Iowa **Army** Ammunition Plant, Iowa
- Lake City **Army** Ammunition Plant, Missouri
- Lone Star **Army** Ammunition Plant, Texas
- McAlester **Army** Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma
- Milan **Army** Ammunition Plant, Tennessee
- Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
- Radford **Army** Ammunition Plant, Virginia

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation



Figure 21.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

These facilities manufacture, receive, issue, store, renovate, test, and demilitarize conventional and chemical ammunition. They also provide quality assurance for special ammunition and depot storage for ammunition and strategic materials.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Ammunition production facilities support the operational requirement of "power projection" by producing ammunition, a key component of military power. The requirement for "acquisition excellence" is supported with facilities that produce state-of-the-art munitions as well as conventional ammunition. With many ammunition plants in layaway status, the Army is positioned to bring several production lines into action should changes in the international environment dictate. In this way, ammunition production facilities also support the operational requirement of "force generation." The ammunition produced at these facilities helps sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy. In this way, these facilities support the operational require nent of "sustainment."

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain a core capability sized to support the peacetime training needs of the force.

(2) Maintain the capability to "accelerate" current production to support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(3) Maintain the capability to reconstitute ammunition stockpiles following two near-simultaneous major regional **conflicts.**

(4) Retain critical production capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization or duplicated by commercial manufacturers.

(5) Maintain capability to act as Department of Defense executive agent for ammunition.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

This particular set of facilities and installations requires redundancy, either within the public or the private sector. In many cases, functions can be combined based upon capacity analysis. However, such consolidation would necessitate the loss of a critical redundant capability, needed in the event of a catastrophic production line failure caused by an explosion. Given these considerations, the Army has reduced ammunition production facilities **to** the minimum number required to meet the needs of two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts while providing the necessary production line redundancy.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The MVA reaffirmed the high military value of each ammunition production site.



Figure 22.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, Tennessee

Holston Army Ammunition Plant (HAAP) produces Research Department and **High** Melt (RDX/HMX) munitions. It also maintains active and standby facilities and equipment in support of national defense objectives. Because of its **high** military value, *HAAP* was not selected for further study.

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, Des Moines County, Iowa

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAP) is a Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) ammunition manufacturing facility. Its basic mission is to load, assemble and pack ammunition. IAAP also has research and development, demilitarization, and ammunition retrograde missions and is a Group Technology Center (GTC) for missile warheads, artillery, 120MM cartridges and demolition charges. Because of its high military value, IAAP was not selected for further study.

Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Jackson County, Missouri

Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (LCAAP) is a Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) ammunition manufacturing facility. Its primary mission is to operate and maintain active and standby facilities to meet current and mobilization requirements for manufacture of small caliber ammunition. Because of its high military value, LCAAP was not selected for further study.

Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Texarkana, Texas

Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant *(LSAAP)* is a Group Technology Center for Improved Conventional Munitions, Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM), M67 hand grenade, detonators, and artillery primers. Because of its high military value, LSAAP was not selected for further study. The Army recommends transferring the ammunition storage mission, interior training center, and rubber production facility from Red River Depot to Lone Star.

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) has state of the art Plastic Blended Explosive (PBX) cast cure and melt pour high density loading facilities. MCAAP has the capability to load, assemble and pack a wide variety of bombs, projectiles, gun ammunition and rockets Under Title 10 U.S. Code, MCAAP has third-party contracts for the Harpoon and High Speed Anti-Radar Missile (HARM missiles. Because of its high military value, MCAAP was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School from Savanna Depot to McAlester.

Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Milan, Tennessee

Milan Army Ammunition Plant (MAAP) is a Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) installation. The primary mission of MAAP is to operate and maintain active and standby production facilities to meet current and mobilization requirements. MAAP missions also include the loading, assembling and packing of small caliber ammunition items; as well as the receipt, surveillance, maintenance, storage, demilitarization, and salvage of field service stocks, and items of industrial stocks. Because of its high military value, MAAP was not selected for further study.

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas

Pine Bluff Arsenal's(PBA) current mission can be categorized into five areas ammunition production, chemical/biological defense production and repair, depot storage, waste management, and chemical weapons management. PBA produces ammunition ranging from 40MM to 175MM including white and red phosphorus, pyrotechnics, practice and training items It supports the engineering and manufacturing development for munitions items with a Production Engineering Laboratory, smoke test facilities and chemical/physical laboratories. It is a chemical/biological (C/B) center for certification and testing of C/B defense equipment, and its waste management mission provides fully permitted waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitted multi-furnace incinerator complex is designed to handle a variety of pyrotechnic mixes, small ammunition, and bulk wastes The storage of 12% of the unitary stockpile of chemical munitions and the storage of non-stockpile chemical material are also managed by PBA Because of its high military value, PBA was not selected for further study.

Radford Army Ammunition Plant, Radford, Virginia

Radford **Army** Ammunition Plant (RAAP) produces propellants and explosives in peacetime as well as during national emergencies. RAAP's mission involves rapidly increasing production for limited periods of time (surges) in response to world crisis. **As** the Army's largest active ammunition plant, RAAP can quickly "ramp up" to satisfy replenishment requirements while other ammunition plants are brought out of standby. :Becauseof its high military value, RAAP was not selected for further study.

G. AMMUNITION STORAGE.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Ammunition Storage installation category.

- Blue Grass Army Depot, Richmond, Kentucky
- Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Mineral County, Nevada
- Pueblo Army Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado
- Savanna Army Depot Activity, Savanna, Illinois
- Seneca Army Depot Activity, Romulus, New York
- Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California
- Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, Utah
- Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon

The following map depicts the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 23.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Ammunition storage facilities receive, store, maintain, demilitarize, and dispose of conventional and special ammunition and other commodities. They store critical and strategic commodities and perform quality assurance surveillance for ammunition and strategic storage.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Ammunition storage facilities support the operational requirement of "power projection" by managing ammunition stockpiles for use in executing the National Military Strategy These stockpiles help sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy In this way, these facilities support the operational requirement of "sustainment "

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain a core capability sized to support the peacetime storage requirements for training and readiness sustainment, as well as combat requirements necessary to fight and win two near simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(2) Retain critical capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization

(3) Maintain capability to act as Department of Defense executive agent for ammunition

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Storage capacity requirements of current ammunition stockpiles have reached and exceeded the design capacity of the storage facilities for two reasons. First, the drawdown in Europe has brought ammunition items back to the continental United States, to facilities that were not projected to store the additional European stocks. Second, the ammunition demilitarization program is being slowed by environmental constraints and a lack of funding on the scale needed to remove excess or obsolete ammunition from the inventory. Even so, several of the smaller ammunition storage sites are projected to be excess to Army requirements within the next several years. The Army is focusing resources for demilitarization of ammunition stockpiles at these installations in order to close excess facilities as rapidly as possible.

The Army has adopted a "tiered concept" to manage ammunition storage facilities. This concept reduces the number of active storage sites and creates efficiencies by realigning the required and non-required stockpile into an appropriate tier activity level. The ammunition stockpile is being distributed within geographically oriented regions using a minimum of installations in each region. Regional distribution fully supports area training requirements and provides an active installation within the proximity of sea ports of embarkation for supporting power projection requirements.

Three levels, or tiers, of installations are organized within each region for identifying the level of activity an installation performs. Tier 1 supports a normal/full-up daily activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks for demilitarization. Tier **2** performs static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements and will eventually store production offset stocks and limited non-required demilitarization stocks Tier *3* will be minimally staffed until the non-required stocks are completely reduced to a zero balance and the facility **is** closed.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The **MVA** integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The Army Stationing Strategy.. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 24.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Blue Grass Army Depot, Richmond, Kentucky

Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) is a Tier 1 Army Materiel Command (AMC) depot performing ammunition, general supply, logistic support to Special Operations Forces (SOF), chemical surety, chemical defense equipment, allied trades and fabrication missions Conventional ammunition operations include receipt, storage, issue, renovation and demilitarization of small arms, artillery rounds, bombs, rockets, flares and mines. The depot's chemical surety operations include storage, security and surveillance of toxic chemical munitions awaiting demilitarization BGAD is a Department of Defense primary center for receipt, storage, issue, testing and minor maintenance of 278 lines of Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE). The 1988 Commission closed the Lexington portion of Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot Because of its high military value, BGAD was not selected for further study.

Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant (HWAAP), Mineral County, Nevada

Hawthorne AAP is a Tier 2 depot that provides receipt, storage (rewarehousing, preservation and packaging), surveillance, renovation, testing, demilitarization/disposal, and issue of conventional ammunition. It maintains the capability to ship/receive containerized munitions, operates a calibration lab, maintains an International Standard Organization (ISO) container maintenance/repair facility and performs ammunition maintenance. Additionally, it provides support to tenant activities located at Hawthorne *AAP:* Marine Corps Programs Office, HWAAP, which performs ballistic testing and component recertification and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Detachment, which operates underwater mine and torpedo maintenance facilities Because of its high military value, HWAAP was not selected for further study.

Pueblo Army Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado

Pueblo ADA is one of eight installations storing chemical munitions in the Continental United States (COWS). The 1988 BRAC Commission realigned the installation. Its initial post realignment mission will be static storage of chemical munitions; however, planning for a chemical demilitarization facility is well underway. Because of its lower military value, Pueblo Army Depot Activity was selected for further study. The Army will not complete planned chemical demilitarization before 2001. Because it would not be able to meet the execution timelines of the 1995 Commission, the Army discontinued its study.

Savanna Army Depot Activity, Savanna, Illinois

Savanna ADA (SVADA) is a Tier 3 depot that receives, stores, issues, renovates, and demilitarizes conventional ammunition and general supplies for Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and DLA. Additionally, it is the center of technical excellence for the demilitarization of depleted uranium ammunition; handles receipt and shipment of containerized cargo; fabricates, rebuilds,

stores and issues ammunition peculiar equipment and related repair parts; conducts ammunition function testing for CONUS under the Centralized Controlled Function Test Program; provides ammunition surveillance inspection/tests/audits of assigned mission stocks; and provides backup general supply storage support for Red River Army Depot. SVADA also provides host support to five tenant activities, including the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS). Because of its lower military value, it was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Seneca Army Depot Activity, Romulus, New York

Seneca ADA is a Tier 3 depot that has two primary missions: the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and demilitarization of conventional munitions; and the receipt, storage, and issue of general supplies, including hazardous materials and prepositioned war reserve stocks. Seneca also has several secondary missions. These include: Special Weapons demilitarization; Radiological Assistance Team assessment and decontamination; Reserve Component and National Guard training; CONUS Care of Materials in Storage (COMIS); Prepositioned Ships Inventory Control Support; and ammunition prototype fabrication. The installation is the home for five tenant organizations: the U.S. Coast Guard LORAN-C Transmitting Station, Defense Finance & Accounting Service; U.S. Army Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment Support Operations; Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office - Romulus Branch; and U.S. Army Health Clinic. Because of its lower military value, it was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Sierra Army Depot, Hurlong, California

Sierra AD (SIAD) is a Tier 3 depot and is the home of the three largest operational project stocks in the Army -- the Inland Petroleum Distribution System, the Water Support System, and the three Force Provider Projects. In addition, SIAD has new operational project stocks missions for Landing Mat, Bridging Materials, and the Bare Base Life Support System. The operational stocks missions include the receipt, storage, issue and maintenance of assigned systems. SIAD continues the missions of the receipt, issue, storage, maintenance, and demilitarization of ammunition. SIAD is home to the U.S. Army Military Police Unit - Sierra, the 34th Explosive Ordnance Detachment and U.S. Army Health Clinic. Because of its lower military value, SIAD was selected for further study. The Army recommends realigning this installation.

Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, Utah

Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) is a Tier 1 depot that re-manufactures and repairs troop support equipment, including generators, topographical equipment and a wide selection of tactical truck and secondary items. TEAD also is the only DoD facility capable of depot-level overhaul of rail equipment for the 60, 80, and 100-ton locomotives. TEAD designs, develops, and fabricates equipment used to renovate and dispose of ammunition at installations throughout the world TEAD also conducts basic research to establish design criteria for ammunition equipment and

performs munitions testing of prototype equipment. In addition **TEAD** provides storage, maintenance, modification, and demilitarization of conventional and chemical ammunition Because of its **high** military value, Tooele was not selected for fbrther study.

Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon

Umatilla Army Depot Activity (UMDA) is a munitions storage facility. It receives, stores, performs care and preservation of class **V** ammunition. Additionally, UMDA operates an open burn/open detonation demilitarization facility. Ammunition containing toxic chemical agents to include bulk agent is also stored at Umatilla. It is realigning due to a **1988** Commission decision and is one of eight installations storing chemical munitions in CONUS. Because of its lower military value, Umatilla was selected for fbrther study. The Army will not complete planned chemical demilitarization before 2001. Because it would not be able to meet the execution timelines of the 1995 Commission, the Army discontinued its study.

H. COMMODITY.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Commodity installations category

- Adelphi Laboratory Center, Adelphi, Maryland
- Cold Regions Research & Engineering Laboratory, Hanover, New Hampshire
- Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan
- Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland
- Fort Monmouth, Eatontown, New Jersey
- Natick Research, Development & Engineering Center, Natick, Massachusetts
- Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey
- Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
- Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 25.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Commodity oriented installations include: integrated centers for research, development, engineering, fielding, and sustainment of weapons systems; laboratories; and National Inventory Control Points. They perform extensive research and engineering development, integrated materiel management, acquisition, technical assistance, security assistance and matrix support to Program Executive Officers. At the installation level, commodity-oriented engineering and logistics functions are largely the melding of the private and public industrial base. Support is provided to Army and Department of Defense Program Managers, and equipment is placed in the hands of soldiers.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Commodity oriented installations support the operational requirement for "power projection" by coordinating the flow of supplies, equipment and repair parts into the theater of operations Additionally, Supply and Maintenance Technical Assistance personnel are often provided to assist with new equipment fielding, maintenance, and other aspects of supply operations.

The "sustainment" requirement is enhanced through their role in providing uninterrupted logistics support from the wholesale level to the retail level. Commodity oriented installations are a key component of the acquisition process, providing matrix support to Program Executive Officers and Project Managers. In this manner, they support the operational requirement of "acquisition excellence."

The research and development centers embedded in multi-functional commodity commands play a significant role in developing technologies that are suitable for military use. As such, they support the "technology development" operational requirement.

These same functions that provide supply support to active duty forces, support mobilizing forces as the Army expands to meet the needs of the situation. These functions, therefore, support the operational requirement of "force generation."

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Preserve only crucial research, development, test and evaluation capabilities that the private sector and academia cannot or will not sustain with their own investment.

(2) Optimize the operational efficiency of the Army's RDT&E and materiel/maintenance management functions.

(3) Provide seamless item materiel management across all commodity groupings

(4) Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Efficiency, achieved through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduced overhead, should be the key consideration in stationing commodity-oriented organizations. Collocation or consolidation of similar functions (e g , commodity-specific research, engineering support, acquisition, item management, logistics support, and matrix support to Program Executive Officers) provides a more efficient solution than maintaining separate installations organized to perform **only** commodity-specific research and engineering support.

Commodity Commands are generally comprised of three interrelated functional elements. The first is oriented on research and development of a commodity group, focusing primarily on new technology and product improvement, but also including engineering support to items in production. The second element is focused on the acquisition function, supporting the development and production requirements of Program Managers. The third is oriented on the sustainment of the commodity group through acquisition and distribution of repair parts, higher level maintenance, and technical support to the field. These three elements function best when a high degree of organizational integration and collocation are achieved. Given the expense of the facility requirements, the most cost-effective, long term stationing solution is the collocation or consolidation of these like elements.

Increasingly sophisticated technology is best bred in a cross-disciplined environment. The Army can rapidly leverage the skills of its research and development, acquisition and logistics network force only if its components are concentrated in a single location. It is possible to consolidate into a smaller number of integrated commodity management centers.

The Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal provides a base upon which to station the sustainment-oriented elements of commodity commands. The significant commonality between the Industrial Operations Command and these sustainment elements of the commodity commands suggests that infrastructure and operating efficiencies can be achieved by collocating or consolidating these elements.

While Fort Detrick is a very small installation, it is of significant military value in that it is home to the Medical Research Development Command. This unique facility conducts highly specialized research in the medical field and would be extremely difficult to replicate at another location.

The reorganization and relocation of Commodity Command elements can assist in the development of a single integrated materiel management system for all commodity groups,

improve efficiency in the research and development field, and reduce costly infrastructure overhead. Similar efficiencies may also be achieved by taking advantage of interservicing opportunities.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The **MVA** integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed earlier in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 26.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Adelphi Laboratory Center, Adelphi, Maryland

The U.S. Adelphi Laboratory Center provides scientific research, technology development, and analysis. Using in-house laboratory efforts and collaboration with academia, industry, other government agencies, and the international community, it conducts independent analysis of weapon system performance in areas of survivability and lethality, human factors, and battlefield environmental effects. Adelphi was developed **as** the home of the Army Research Laboratory during BRAC 91. Realignments into Adelphi are underway. Because of its **high** military value, Adelphi was not selected for further study.

Cold Regions Research & Engineering Laboratory (CRREL), Hanover, New Hampshire

CRREL conducts cold region scientific and engineering research. Its focus is on providing technology which will allow the Army and DoD to operate effectively in cold region environments. Because CRREL ranked relatively low in the Army's military value assessment, it was selected for further study. Due to the costs associated with closure, the Army decided to retain this installation.

Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan

Detroit Arsenal provides technical support to the **U.S.** Army Tank Automotive & Armaments Command, the Tank Automotive Research, Development & Engineering Center, and the National Inventory Control Point and Acquisition Center for tracked and wheeled vehicles. Its missions include the design, testing, acquisition, manufacturing, fielding, and demilitarization of tracked and wheeled vehicles for the Department of Defense. The 1988 Commission closed Pontiac Storage Activity, a sub-installation. Because of its high military value, Detroit Arsenal was not selected for fbrther study. However, the Army recommends the closure of one of its tenants, Detroit Tank Plant. See Section 3M, Industrial Facilities. Furthermore, the Army recommends relocating some functions of Aviation-Troop Command from St. Louis to Detroit Arsenal.

Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland

Fort Detrick provides technical expertise and installation support to a number of agencies and non-Department of Defense tenant organizations involved in biomedical R&D, medical materiel management, medical intelligence, and long-haul communications serving the White House, Department of Defense and other governmental agencies. Fort Detrick possesses unique facilities and conducts highly specialized medical research. In view of its high military value, Fort Detrick was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating various units and activities fiom Fort Ritchie to Fort Detrick. The Army also recommends redirecting a portion of toxicology research to Fort Detrick, instead of relocating it to Wright-Patterson AFB.

Fort Monmouth, Eatontown, New Jersey

Realigned as a result of a 1993 Commission decision, Fort Monmouth provides support to a large number of command, control, communications, intelligence, and electronic warfare study efforts. It has a multi-functional focus on research, development, engineering, acquisition, and sustainment of command, control, communications and electronic warfare functions. Because of its military value, Fort Monmouth was not selected for fbrther study. The Army recommends relocating the Military Traffic Management Command's Eastern Area Command headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st major port Command fiom Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal to Fort Monmouth. Furthermore, the Army recommends relocating functions related to materiel management of communication and electronics fiom Aviation-Troop Command in St. Louis to Fort Monmouth.

Natick Research, Development & Engineering Center (NRDEC), Natick, Massachusetts

Natick's research focuses on the soldier and soldier support systems The products and equipment resulting from such R&D efforts support the survivability, sustainability, supportability, combat effectiveness, and quality of life of the soldier operating under world-wide environmental extremes and hazardous conditions. These include combat clothing systems, individual protection products, airdrop equipment, rations, organizational equipment, tactical shelters, tentage, and humanitarian aid. Because of NRDECs relatively low military value, it was selected for further study. After careful review of the operational and financial impact of transferring Natick and associated research activities, the Army elected to discontinue its study of closure/realignment options. The Army recommends relocating functions related to soldier systems from Aviation-Troop Command in St. Louis to Natick.

Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey

Picatinny Arsenal's mission is to conduct and to manage the research, development and engineering for assigned armaments and munition systems. Picatinny scored high in the installation assessment; however, it ranked low in military value. Its facilities are older and require substantial funds to renovate or replace. Without substantial investment, Picatinny lacks the infrastructure to support integrated life cycle functions. Picatinny was studied and deferred because it was not found to be financially advantageous.

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

Redstone Arsenal is the center for Army missile technology. Its mission is to develop, acquire, and provide logistical support for all air defense and artillery missiles used by the Army, other military departments, and many foreign customers. Redstone Arsenal provides an integrated materiel management system. Redstone scored high in installation assessment and high in military value. Therefore, this installation was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating aviation functions from Aviation-Troop Command in St. Louis to Redstone Arsenal

Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois

Rock Island Arsenal has three primary missions: manufactures weapons and components for domestic and foreign markets; provides logistical support to large scale tool set fabrications and assembly operations; and provides base operations support for numerous tenants. Rock Island scored relatively high in the installation assessment and high in military value. Accordingly, Rock Island was not selected for further study.

I. PORTS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Ports installation category:

- Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, New Jersey
- Oakland Army Base, Oakland, California
- Sunny Point Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 27.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Ports are industrial facilities that support the deployment of United States-based power projection forces. These installations conduct transportation engineering, traffic management, and terminal operations. They provide terminal facilities as well as staging areas for forces and equipment.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Ports provide support for the operational requirements of "power projection" and "strategic agility." Without ports, the power resident in the United States could not be projected to the appropriate theater of operations. Proper location, capacity, and ease of access to port facilities contribute significantly to the fast reaction times required for strategic agility.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain the capability to support the Army's power projection strategy

(2) Maintain the capability to project forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts

(3) Maintain the capability to ship unique cargo not allowed in commercial ports

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Sufficient commercial port capacity is available on each coast to support the power projection requirements of the National Military Strategy. While military ports provide control and security not available at commercial facilities, there are **few** unique military requirements that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports.

There is no operational requirement to retain military ports whose primary capabilities can be duplicated at a commercial port. However, military ports that satisfy unique military requirements such as shipping large, bulk quantities of live ammunition must be retained.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The Army Stationing Strategy The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below



Figure 28.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne, Bayonne, New Jersey

Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne (MOTBY) is **an** Army-awned terminal facility which supports European, African, Mediterranean, and South American theaters of operation. MOTBY provides secure water terminal facilities for the rapid power projection into theaters of operations around the world during conflict or fast-breaking contingencies. Because MOTBY's primary capabilities can be duplicated by commercial activities, it was selected as a study candidate. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Oakland Army Base, Oakland, California

Oakland Army Base is an Army-owned terminal facility which supports Alaska, Hawaii, Pacific and Far East Theaters of Operation. It provides secure water terminal facilities for the rapid power projection into theaters of operations around the world during conflict or fast-breaking contingencies. Because Oakland's primary capabilities can be duplicated by commercial activities, it was selected as a study candidate. After a review of available west coast port activities, the Army determined that the closure of Oakland does not justify operational risks and, therefore, decided to retain this installation.

Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, Wilmington, North Carolina

The Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) mission is to plan, coordinate, and execute movement of ammunition and other dangerous cargo. It is the sole common user ammunition terminal in the Army inventory. Because of MOTSU's unique ammunition capability, it was not selected for further study.

J. DEPOTS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Depots installation category.

- Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Anniston, Alabama
- Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD), Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
- Red River Army Depot (RRAD), Texarkana, Texas
- Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD), Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania

The Army operates one additional maintenance depot, Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD), Corpus Christi, Texas. **As** a tenant activity of a Navy installation, CCAD falls outside the purview of the Army Base Closure and Realignment process. However, CCAD was evaluated by DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for depots (See Appendix **A).**

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure *29.*

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Depots perform a variety of maintenance, supply, and storage missions. They overhaul, rebuild, modify, convert, repair, and fabricate Army equipment. Depots provide logistics and supply support for weapons, operate repair facilities, distribute maintenance information, respond to maintenance questions, recondition materiel, and conduct maintenance testing, repair, storage, and disposal of commodities.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Maintenance depots support the "sustainment" requirement by replenishing Army equipment stocks at the wholesale level and by providing immediate on-site technical assistance to field units as required. These same functions support mobilizing forces, thereby contributing to the operational requirement of "force generation."

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Retain only core capabilities sized to support the sustainment needs of the force.

(2) Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

The specialized equipment and expensive facilities inherent in this category argue for reduction of facility capacity to the level required to support only the core workload. In cases where similar workloads are performed at separate locations, consolidation should be the primary objective. Further reduction in facility requirements is possible by pursuing commercial alternatives to materiel stockage. Consolidation of workload and infrastructure reduction are necessary in order to achieve maximum efficiency and reduce unaffordable operating and overhead costs.

Depot facilities should be reduced and realigned according to commodity group workloads. While multi-functional depots are possible, long term requirements suggest separate ground, air, and electronic-oriented maintenance depots best match the Army's battlefield functions of the future.

Interservicing may offer the best solution to improving efficiency and reducing duplication of depot functions within the Department of Defense and should be considered before amving at a stationing decision incorporating Army workload only.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment **(MVA)** was conducted for each installation category. The **MVA** integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The **Army** Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 30.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama

Anniston Army Depot is a multi-functional depot that receives, stores, issues and maintains ammunition and heavy combat vehicles including the M1A1 Abrams tank. The depot provides the sole DoD capability for machining tank turrets, and is the Center of Technical Excellence for both heavy combat vehicles and small arms. Anniston is also a Tier *2* ammunition storage site (see Section H). Because of its high military value, it was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle maintenance mission from Letterkenny Depot and the light combat vehicle maintenance mission from Red River Depot to Anniston.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

Letterkenny Army Depot is one of three multi-functional depots with ground vehicle, missile, and ammunition missions. It provides depot level maintenance/repair, overhaul, and modification of missile systems, tactical vehicles, towed and self-propelled howitzers, detection systems, muzzle velocity radar, and their associated sub-assemblies and support equipment. Letterkenny is a Tier 2 ammunition storage site. It receives, stores, maintains, and issues all types of ammunition items from small arms ammunition to large bomhs and missiles. Additionally, the depot has an extensive demilitarization program for munitions. Although a center for DoD tactical missile repair, Letterkenny rated relatively low in military value when compared to other Army depots and was selected for further study. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance recommended closing this depot. The Army recommends realigning this installation.

Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas

As a millti-functional depot, Red River has both major ammunition storage and light combat vehicle maintenance missions. The depot provides repair, overhaul, and modification to the Army's fleet of Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the M1 13 family of vehicles, land combat missile platforms, and tactical vehicles. Red River has DoD's only rubber facility, providing injection molding (roadwheels and track) and a fluidized bed rubber removal. The depot, a Tier 2 ammunition storage site, has an extensive ammunition storage, renovation, and modification program. It is a Tier 2 ammunition storage site. Because of its lower military value, it was selected for further study. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance recommended closing this installation. The Army concurs and recommends closing this installation.

Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania

Tobyhanna Army Depot is a single function depot for ground communications-electronics, and associated shelters and containers. The depot has no ammunition storage mission or related functions. The newest of the Army's depots, Tobyhanna's primary maintenance mission includes the overhaul, rebuild, modification, conversion, repair, and fabrication of strategic and tactical communications and photographic equipment. Because of its high military value, it was not selected for further study. Under the Army's recommendation to realign Letterkenny, missile guidance and control system maintenance will be conducted at Tobyhanna.

K. PROVING GROUNDS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Proving Grounds installation category.

- Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland
- Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah
- White Sands Missile Range **(WSMR),** New Mexico
- Yuma Proving Ground (YPG), Arizona

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.

Figure 31.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Proving grounds support developmental tests that evaluate the battlefield application of new technology over a wide range of terrain and climatic conditions. This testing includes all types of equipment and munitions, including specialized weapons systems.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Proving grounds provide capabilities in support of "technology development" requirements not available in private industry. As the Army downsizes, technological advancements play an even greater role in battlefield success. Throughout history, victory has gone to the side that makes the best use of available technology.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain adequate acreage, range capacity, and facilities to support the Army testing program.

(2) Retain those proving grounds with the greatest capability for facility and range expansion.

(3) Maintain the capability to evaluate materiel over the full range of terrain and climatic conditions.

(4) Locate soldier-intensive testing at installations with large soldier populations such as maneuver installations.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Proving grounds have been developed at several different geographic locations. The testing community has gradually aligned its facilities around specific commodities, attempting to minimize duplication of facilities. Operationally, the best approach to achieving greater efficiency is collocation of test functions. This could be done on as few as two of the major proving ground installations with smaller test facilities located on installations from other categories. Additionally, proving grounds should be sized to minimize duplication of capabilities available in either private industry or the Department of Defense.

Collocation of proving grounds allows closure of installations and realignment of affected testing facilities. However, proving grounds are facility intensive, making relocation extremely expensive, as no installation is currently structured to receive another testing facility without significant new construction. Interservicing may offer the best solution to improving efficiency of proving grounds and reducing duplication of functions within DoD.

(2) Military Value Assessment

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the. Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below



Figure 32.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) is a major research, development, and testing installation. It provides administrative management to numerous organizations, including significant Navy test facilities. As a primary mobilization station, APG is the host **to** a potential of *25* to 50 company sized Army Reserve and National Guard units. Because of its high military value, APG was not selected for further study. The Army recommends relocating chemical/biological research from Dugway to Aberdeen.

Dugway Proving Ground, Arizona

Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) plans, conducts, and reports the results of developmental tests of chemical warfare munitions, chemical and biological defense systems, flame, incendiary, smoke obscurant and illuminating weapons systems. DPG safeguards, stores, transports, and uses chemical surety materiel, provides security, and removal/disposal of unwanted chemical surety materiel. It plans, conducts, and reports the results of performance and survivability of DoD materiel in a tropical environment. Because of its low military value, DPG was selected for further study. The Army recommends realigning this installation.

White **Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico**

WSMR is operated and maintained primarily in support of research, development, and testing of weapon and space systems, subsystems, and components. This major range and test facility supports all DoD components, other government agencies, and various foreign agencies. WSMR is the only site in the United States large enough **(2** million + acres) to fire all Army missile and artillery systems. Because of its high military value, WSMR was not selected for further study.

Yuma Proving Ground, Utah

Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) plans, conduct!;, and analyzes developmental tests conducted by proponent materiel developers, producers, and contractors for the following types of materiel: tube artillery systems, aircraft armament systems, air delivery systems, and air mobility equipment. It also performs desert environmental tests on all classes of Army materiel. It is also receiving functions as a result of the 1988 decision to close Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana. Because of its high military value, YPG was not selected for :furtherstudy. The Army recommends relocating the smoke and obscurant mission from Dugway to Yuma.

L. MEDICAL CENTERS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Medical Centers installation category

- Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Denver, Colorado
- Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington D.C.

The following map shows the geographic distribution of these Medical Centers



Figure 33.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Medical centers provide patient care, graduate medical education, and medical research. Patient care ranges from simple outpatient treatment **to** sophisticated specialty care and includes referral care from other facilities. Graduate medical education provides military-oriented graduate medical training essential to the recruitment and retention of military physicians. Medical center research has produced significant medical advances.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Medical centers support the operational requiirements of "'sustainment" and "training and education." Whether by providing medical care to casualties of war or preventive medicine for soldiers in training, medical centers sustain the human dimension of combat power. Modem technology has enhanced the direct impact of medical centers on battlefield medicine by linking COWS-based medical experts with combat medics through satellite communications. By increasing the medical expertise available on the battlefield, preventive medicine and treatment of minor wounds make a significant contribution to the sustainment of combat power in theater.

The graduate medical education (GME) conducted at Army medical centers supports the operational requirement of "training and education." This specialized training allows medical students to focus on aspects of medicine peculiar to the Army. By concentrating on the illnesses and wounds most likely to impact on soldiers, Army medical training provides the most efficient and effective use of scarce resources.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain the capability to conduct graduate medical education and research.

(2) Using a combination of military and private service, meet peacetime requirements for military and military family patient care.

(3) Maintain the Capability to medically support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(4) Maintain the capability to support reconstitution of Army forces in transition from one theater of operations to another, or following two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(5) Where possible, maintain the capability to provide wartime medical support at a facility located in the theater of operations.

(6) Avoid significant construction costs due to recapitalization of substandard facilities where reasonable alternatives are available.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Where possible, medical centers should reduce excess patient capacity, minimize uneconomical referral practices, eliminate duplication of Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs, and focus on providing efficient medical support to active duty populations The Army cannot afford to maintain medical facilities that primarily support a retired population. Medical centers not collocated with sizable active component populations do not provide cost-effective medical care, nor do they contribute to the quality of life for active component soldiers and their families In such cases, the medical center fails to support the operational requirements of the Army

On the other hand, medical centers that, as a result of geographical location, provide support directly **to** a potential theater of operations possess significant military value and should be retained.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed previously in The Anny Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations The MVA provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure 34.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), Aurora, Colorado

FAMC is located seven miles east of downtown Denver, CO, and is one of seven Army medical centers in the US. It has two catchment areas of service. Within a 40-mile radius, primary care is provided to approximately 7,000 active duty personnel, approximately 10,000 family members, and more than 41,000 retirees and their families. The second catchment area includes Illinois, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Montana, Missouri, Idaho, and Iowa. Because of FAMC's low military value, it was selected for further study. DoD's Medical Joint Cross-Service Group recommended closing this medical center. The Army concurs and recommends closing this installation.

Tripler Army hledical Center (TAMC), Honolulu, Hawaii

Tripler is the only DoD Medical Center providing tertiary care for the Pacific Basin. It supports more than 279,000 active duty, family members, retirees, and veterans locally, and an additional 579,000 beneficiaries throughout the Pacific. TAMC has a Readiness/Deployment mission to augment U.S. forces in Korea with more than 700 physicians, nurses, and enlisted medical technicians as a part of the Korean Medical Augmentation Package (KMAP). Because TAMC provides support directly to USCINCPAC, a potential theater of operations, it possesses significant military value and was, therefore, not ,selected for further study. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group-Medical also recommended retaining this medical center.

Walter Reed Army hledical Center (WRAMC), Washington, DC

Located in the District of Columbia, WRAMC is the Army's largest medical center and has more than 61,400 beneficiaries in the immediate Washington metropolitan area. In addition, WRAMC is the tertiary care facility for the northeastern United States, and has more than 631,400 beneficiaries in this area. WRAMC is the principal clinical teaching hospital for the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences as well as a teaching hospital for medical students from George Washington, Howard, and Georgetown Universities. Because of its high military value, WRAMC was not selected for further study. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group-Medical also recommended retaining his installation.

M. INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Industrial Facilities installation category:

- Detroit Tank Plant, Warren, Michigan
- Lima *Army* Tank Plant, Lima, Ohio
- Stratford Army Engine Plant, Stratford, Connecticut
- Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.



Figure 35.

(1) The **Army** Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Industrial facilities receive, store, and incorporate raw materials and sub-components into the manufacturing process for end-items and components. They perform quality assurance and conduct acceptance testing of their products.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Industrial facilities manufacture end-items and components, thereby supporting the operational requirement for "acquisition excellence." The products manufactured at industrial facilities help sustain warfighting forces deployed in support of the power projection strategy. ***As*** such, they support the "sustainment" operational requirement. These facilities also maintain some surge capability in support of the "force generation" requirement.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Retain critical capabilities that cannot be readily reconstituted during mobilization or duplicated by commercial manufacturers.

(2) Maintain the capability to assist in the generation of forces required to support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

The industrial base that was developed in response to potential Cold War requirements is no longer needed to support the National Military Strategy. Wherever possible, the nation's commercial industrial capacity should be used to provide military production requirements. Given the similarity of some production facilities and the commodities they produce, consolidation at the largest, most modem facility is advisable. In general, this consolidation can be accomplished with little additional construction or renovation. Only those industrial production lines that have requirements programmed in Army POM 96-01 arid the FY95 President's Budget should be retained. Facilities that produce unique products, not readily available in the private sector, should be retained or, if not currently funded, be mothballed for future use.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint discussed previously in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The **MVA** provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.



Figure *36.*

(3) Installation **Analysis.**

Detroit Army **Tank** Plant, **Warren, Michigan**

Detroit Army Tank Plant is part of the Detroit .Arsenal complex and is a Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) facility. There is no tank production projected at the Detroit Army **Tank** Plant. Given the absence of programmed **work,** it was selected for further study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, Ohio

Lima Tank Plant is a GOCO operation and is the sole production site for MI Abrams Tank systems, its related structures, components, and materials. Production of the M1A1/2 tanks for

U.S. forces has ceased at this time. Likewise, foreign military sales production is also very limited. Because of its low military value, Lima was selected for further study. Since the Army recommends closing Detroit Tank Plant, the Army recommends that Lima remain open as its only operating tank plant.

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Stratford, Connecticut

Stratford Army Engine Plant is a GOCO facility and is the production facility for the AGT 1500 Turbine Engine used in the M1 family of tanks. Additionally, the facility supports the T-53 and T-55 Turbine Engines for the Army and Navy Landing Craft **Air** Cushion (LCAC). The facility also conducts some developmental projects. Because of its low military value, it was selected for additional study. The Army recommends closing this installation.

Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York

Watervliet Arsenal is a manufacturing facility responsible for the manufacture of gun tubes for tanks, howitzers, mortars, and naval cannons. Additionally, it provides repair and fabrication for associated items of equipment. Because of its high military value, it was not selected for additional study.

N. LEASED FACILITIES.

DoD Component organizations located in leased space are subject to BRAC legislation Certain military activities performed in leased facilities constitute an installation because of common mission, permanently authorized personnel, and separate support structure. Civilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization located on a nearby military installation or one within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA), were considered part of the civilian personnel authorizations of that installation The National Capital Region (NCR), was used as the MSA for all leases within the Washington D.C metropolitan area

The installations / activities listed below were evaluated within the Leased Facilities category in accordance with the Army stationing guidelines. Leases (including groups of leases in the same headquarters and same geographical area) costing more than $200K, per 10 U.S.C. 2662, were identified as candidate installations.

- Army Research Office, Raleigh, NC

- HQ, Aviation and Troop Command, MO

- HQ, U.S. Army Materiel Command, VA (NCR)

- HQ, U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, VA (NCR)

- HQ, U.S. Army Personnel Command, VA (NCR.)

- HQ, Space and Strategic Defense Command, AL

- Judge Advocate General School, Charlottesville, VA

- Military Traffic Management Command, VA (NCR)

- National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, **VA**

- Office of the Judge Advocate General, VA (NCR)

- U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, MD (NCR)

- U.S. Army Information Systems Software Command, VA (NCR)

- U.S. Army Personnel Center, MO

- U.S. Army Space Command, CO

- U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, VA (NCR)

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation / activity.



Figure **37.**

Installation Analysis.

Army Research Office, North **Carolina**

Army Research Office (ARO) is located at 401 Trade Street in Durham, NC. The facilities, leased from Cedarwood Associates contain 24,551 square feet of administrative space and some computer specific space. There are 2 military and 107 civilian personnel. Realignment of ARO was not financially advantageous and, therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

HQ, **Aviation Troop Support Command, St. Louis, Missouri**

HQ, Aviation Troop Support Command (ATCOM) located at 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard in St. Louis, MO, consists of 21 leases and houses HQ, ATCOM and Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation. All leases are GSA. ATCOM is responsible for the research, development, engineering, and logistical support for Army airmobile systems and support of field and troop support items. The facilities contain 1,089,198 square feet of administrative space, and some light industrial space. The installation has considerable automated data processing specific space. There are 267 military and 5,239 civilian personnel. ATCOM was selected for further study. The Army recommends vacating this facility.

HQ, **Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia**

HQ, Army Materiel Command (AMC) is located at 5001 Eisenhower Avenue in Alexandria, VA. The facilities, leased from GSA, contain 433,540 square feet of administrative space and some computer specific space. There are 146 military and 1,229 civilian personnel. Realignment of HQ, AMC was not financially advantageous and, therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

HQ, **U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Virginia**

U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) is located at 4501 Ford Avenue in Alexandria, VA. OPTEC is responsible for all operational testing within the material acquisition process. A subordinate activity, The U.S. Army Operational Evaluation Command is presently collocated with OPTEC in Alexandria and scheduled to move to Fort Hood, TX in 1996 as part of OPTEC 2000 redesign. The facilities, leased from **GSA,** contain 129,805 square feet of administrative space and some computer space. There are 174 military and 178 civilian personnel. The reorganization of OPTEC will leave approximately 50 personnel in the NCR. Realignment was not financially advantageous and, therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

HQ, **U.S. Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia**

HQ, US Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) is located at 200 Stovall Street in Alexandria, VA. The facilities, leased from GSA, contain 735,052 square feet of administrative space including some computer specific space. There are 833 military, 3,554 civilian, and no contractor personnel. Realignment was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

HQ, Space and Strategic Defense Command, Huntsville, Alabama

HQ, Space and Strategic Defense Command is located in Research **Park** in Huntsville, AL. It consists of 11 leases, and houses elements of AMC Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Army Ballistic Missile Defense (Office(ABMDO). The facilities, leased from

GSA, Putman Construction, Progress Center, Tech Micro Contractors, Romar Enterprises, and Westminister Group, contain 127,150 square feet of administrative and some computer specific space. There are 35 military and 915 civilian personnel. Realignment of this headquarters was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

Judge Advocate General **School,** Virginia

The Judge Advocate General School is located at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, **VA.** The facilities, leased from the University of Virginia, contain 114,796 square feet of administrative/classroom space. There are 56 military, *37* civilian personnel, and 189 students. Realignment of the school was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued its study of this lease site.

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), **Bailey's** Cross-Roads, **Virginia**

MTMC is located in three leased locations in the NCR. They are the Nassif building, the Ballston Tower II, and the Webb Building. They include 137,000 square feet of administrative and computer specific space and approximately 700 personnel. Realignment of this activity was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of these sites.

The National Ground Intelligence Center, Virginia (formerly the Foreign Science Technology Center)

The National Ground Intelligence Center is located at *5* separate locations in Charlottesville, **VA.** The facilities, leased from GSA, contain 81,514 square feet of administrative space and some computer specific space. There are 108 military and 502 civilian personnel. Realignment was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued its study of this lease site.

The Judge Advocate General, Bailey's Cross-Roads, Virginia

The Judge Advocate General is located in the Nassif building at Bailey's Crossroads, **VA.** They occupy 25,600 square feet of predominantly administrative space for 105 personnel. Realignment of this unit was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland

U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (USACAA) is located at 8120 Battery Lane in Bethesda, MD. USACAA is a field operating agency under the Director of the Army Staff which performs independent studies and analyses. The facility, leased from **GSA,** consists of 50,905 square feet of space with a small amount of specialized computer space. Free parking is very limited. There are *57* military and **144** civilian personnel. The Army recommends closing this facility.

U.S. Army Information Systems Software Command, Fairfax, VA
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Falls Church, VA
Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG), Arlington, VA

A combination of leased facilities in the National Capital Region consisting of the Ballston Tower II, the Webb Building, and Crown Ridge. MTMC and TJAG are split between the leased Nassif building at Bailey's Crossroads, VA and Ballston Tower II and Webb Building. Information Systems Software Command had elements in the MELPAR building in Arlington, VA at the beginning of the study and have since relocated to a new leased facility at Crown Ridge in Fairfax, VA. The realignment of MTMC and TJAG elements was not financially advantageous and, therefore, the Army discontinued study of those lease sites. The Army recommends closing the Crown Ridge lease site and realigning ISSC.

U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, St. Louis, Missouri

U.S. Army Personnel Center is located at **9700** Page Boulevard and 1655 Woodson Road in Overland, MO. The facilities, leased from GSA, contain **439,943** square feet of administrative space and approximately 100,000 square feet of computer specific space. There are 559 military and 1,408 civilian personnel. Realignment of ARF'ERCEN was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

U.S. Army Space Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado

U.S. Army Space Command is located at 1670 Newport in Colorado Springs, CO. The facilities, leased from GSA, contain 27,419 square feet of administrative and some computer specific space. There are **363** military and 105 civilian personnel. Due to the poor return on investment of this option, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, Virginia

The Crystal City lease located on Jefferson Davis Highway in Arlington, **VA** consists of one lease and houses HQ, Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC), and an element of U.S. Army Space Command. The facilities, leased from GSA, contain 12,000 square feet of administrative space and some computer specific space. There are **2**1 military, 50 civilian, and 6 contractor personnel. Realignment of HQ, SSDC was not financially advantageous; therefore, the Army discontinued study of this lease site.

O. MINOR SITES.

During the BRAC process leading up to the development of Army recommendations, the department completed a comprehensive review of all its property holdings. After careful review and analysis, the Major Army Commands (MACOMs) submitted a number of minor sites that were excess to mission requirements.

- East Fort Baker, C.4
- Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA
- Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY
- Camp Pedricktown, NJ
- Camp Kilmer, NJ
- Fort Missoula, MT
- Big Coppett Key, FL
- Camp Bonneville, WA
- Fort Worden Cemetery, WA
- Fort Stevens Cemetery, OR
- Bothell Army Reserve Center, WA
- Defense Support Activity Boston, MA
- Sudbury Training Annex, MA
- Hingham Cohasset, MA
- Recreation Center #2, NC
- Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, CA
- Ravenna Army Ammunition Plant, OH
- Balitmore Publications Distribution Center, MD
- Caven Point U.S. Ariny Reserve Center (USARC), NJ
- Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), WV

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation



Figure 38.

(1) Military Value Assessment.

(a) Methodology.

Each Minor Site received a military value assessment (conducted at the MACOM headquarters) which evaluated the first four DoD Selection Criteria (the criteria that measure military value). In each case, the site recommended for closure or realignment has virtually no military value and is excess to the Army's needs.

(b) Military Value Assessment Methodology

Significant factors influencing the decision to close or realign these sites were:

(1) Current and future mission requirements and their impact on operational readiness of DoD's total force (DoD Criteria #1).

- Location of Facility. The Army considered whether the geographic location of each site was unique and/or critical.

- Tenants. The Army reviewed the tenants located on each installation to ensure they can relocate easily.

- Reserve Component Impacts. The Active and Reserve component missions were fully considered. Necessary facilities and land were retained for reserve activities that cannot relocate

(2) The availability and condition of the land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations (DoD Criteria #2).

- Land. The Army screened each site to confirm that land holdings were excess to current requirements.

- Facilities. The Army screened the facilities at each site to confirm that service-owned real property was excess to current requirements.

- Environmental Impacts. The Army reviewed the overall environmental condition of the facility and the environmental impact on potential reuse.

(3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations (DoD Criteria #3).

- Future use. The Army assessed the potential for future use of the sites.

(4) The cost and manpower implications (DoD Criteria #4)

- Cost of Base Operations. The Army considered the cost of base support and used DoD's COBRA model to calculate the recurring savings and return on investment.

(c) Operational and Stationing Requirements;. The Army Stationing Strategy does not specifically address the operational or stationing requirements for these facilities. However, it does encourage fiscal responsibility, reduction of excess, and consolidation of military functions on a lesser number of installations.

(d) Identifying the Study Candidates. The MACOM headquarters identified all of the candidate sites as excess to the Army's needs.

(e) Final Screening Criteria. Headquarters, Department of the Army evaluated each candidate site for operational impact and return on investment. Each closure or realignment has a return on investment of less than five years, is excess to the Army, and has a potential civilian reuse.

(2) Installations Considered for Closure:

East **Fort** Baker, **CA**

East Fort Baker is located in Marin County, CA at the north end of the Golden Gate Bridge. The installation is permitted to the Army from the Golden Gate National Recreation Center and consists of 390,000 square feet of administrative space and housing on **347** acres. There are 84 military and 70 civilian authorized positions on East Fort Baker, CA. The major tenants are the 91st Training Division HQ and the 6th Recruiting Brigade. The Army recommends closure of East Fort Baker.

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center is located near Rio Vista, CA and consists of 37,000 square feet of facilities and 28 acres. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, **CA.**

Bellmore **Logistics Activity, NY**

Bellmore Logistics Activity is located on Long Island, NY and consists of 182,000 square feet of administrative and maintenance space on **17** acres. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of the Bellmore Logistics Activity.

Camp Pedricktown, NJ

Camp Pedricktown is located near Pedricktown, NJ and consists of approximately 260,000 square feet of operations and storage facilities on 82 acres. The primary mission of Camp

Pedricktown is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. Major tenants are 6th Brigade, 96th Training Division and the 338th Medical Group HQ. There are 136 military reserve component positions on Camp Pedricktown. The Army recommends closure of Camp Pedricktown.

Camp Kilmer, NJ

Camp Kilmer is located near Edison, NJ and consists of approximately 33 1,000 square feet of operations and maintenance facilities on 75 acres. The primary mission of Camp Kilmer is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. Major tenants are the 78th Division Training Support Brigade and the 78th Training Division HQ. There are 34 active duty military and **25** full time civilian positions and over 700 part-time reserve component positions on Camp Kilmer. The Army recommends Camp Kilmer for closure.

Fort **Missoula, MT**

Fort Missoula is located near Missoula, MT and consists of approximately 180,000 square feet of operations and maintenance facilities on 35 acres. The primary mission of Fort Missoula is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. Fort Missoula also provides facilities for the United Stated Forest Service. Major tenants are the 163rd Armor Battalion, 1063rd Engineer Company, and the U.S Navy Reserve. There are 28 active duty military and 232 full time civilian positions (230 are U.S. Forest Service), and over 400 part-time reserve component positions on Fort Missoula The Army recommends Fort Missoula for closure.

Big Coppett Key, FL

Big Coppett Key is an island about 11 miles east of Key West, FL and consists of 3,000 square feet of communications facilities on five acres. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of Big Coppett Key.

Camp Bonneville, WA

Camp Bonneville, WA is located in Clark County, **WA** and consists of approximately 178,000 square feet of administrative and operational facilities on 4,000 acres. The primary mission of Camp Bonneville is to provide training facilities for active and reserve component units. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of Camp Bonneville.

Fort Worden Cemetery, WA

Fort Worden Cemetery is located in Renton, WA and consists of 150 square feet of facilities on one acre. The Army has decided to pursue transfer of this facility to the Department of Veterans Affairs outside the BRAC process.

Fort Stevens Cemetery, **OR**

Fort Stevens Cemetery is located in Hammond, OR and consists of 2 acres of land and no facilities. The Army has decided to pursue transfer of this facility to the Department of Veterans Affairs outside the BRAC process.

Bothell **Army** Reserve Center, WA

Bothell Army Reserve Center is located in Bothell, WA and consists of 80,000 square feet of facilities on **42** acres The primary mission of Bothell is to provide facilities for Army Reserve units. The major tenants are the 124th ARCOM, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Snohomish County Fire Department. There are 15 active duty military and 6 full time civilian positions and over 240 part-time reserve component positions on Bothell Army Reserve Center. The Army decided to pursue transfer of the center to another federal agency outside the BRAC process.

Defense **Support** Activity Boston, **MA**

Defense Support Activity Boston is located in Boston, MA and consists of 600,000 square feet of administrative buildings on **14** acres. The primary mission of Defense Support Activity Boston is to provide administrative support space for DoD agencies located in the Boston area. The Major tenants are the 94th ARCOM, an Army Recruiting Battalion, and Navy activities. There are 171 active duty military and 1,031 full time civilian positions, and over 850 part-time reserve component positions on Defense Support Activity Boston. The Army decided to pursue transfer of this activity to another military department outside the BRAC process.

Sudbury Training Annex, **MA**

Sudbury Training Annex, MA is located near Sudbury, MA and consists of approximately 200,000 square feet of storage facilities on 2,000 acres. The primary mission of Sudbury Training Annex is to provide storage facilities for various Department of Defense activities. Major tenants are the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Air Force Geo Physics Lab. There are 35 civilian and 3 contractor personnel authorizations on Sudbury Training Annex, MA. The Army recommends closure of the annex.

Hingharn Cohasset, MA

Hingham Cohasset is located in Hingham, MA and consists of approximately 150,000 square feet of administrative, storage, and production facilities on **125** acres. Hingham Cohasset has no current mission. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of Hingham Cohasset.

Recreation Center #2, NC

Recreation Center #2 is located in Fayetteville, NC and consists of approximately **4** acres and 17,000 square feet of community facilities. Recreation Center #2 is currently being leased to the city of Fayetteville, NC. There are currently no tenants. The Army recommends closure of the center.

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, CA

Branch USDB, Lompoc is located in Lompoc, CA and consists of approximately 812,000 square feet of detention facilities on 4,000 acres. Branch USDB, Lompoc is permitted to and operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army Activities on USDB, Lompoc. The Army recommends closure of this activity.

Ravenna Army Ammunition **Plant,** OH

Ravenna AAP is located near Akron, Ohio and consists of approximately 21,000 acres and **4.7** million square feet of production, storage, and maintenance facilities. The primary mission of Ravenna AAP is to provide storage of ammunition components **and** national strategic stocks. Ravenna's production facilities are inactive. The major tenants are the Ohio National Guard and the Ammunition Storage contractors. There are 4 fulltime civilian positions and **132** part-time reserve component positions. Closure of Ravenna AAP was not financially attractive and was not recommended for closure.

Baltimore **Publications Distribution Center, MD**

The U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore is currently leasing 676,000 square feet of a GSA building in Baltimore, MD. The mission of this activity is to distribute forms and publications on a volume basis to worldwide locations. There are *2* military and 129 civilian personnel authorizations at the Baltimore Publications Distribution Center. The Army recommends closure of this site.

Caven Point U.S. **Army Reserve Center (USARC), NJ**

Caven Point Army Reserve Center is located near Jersey City, NJ and consists of approximately 45,000 square feet of administrative and maintenance facilities on 15 acres. The

primary mission of Caven Point USARC is to provide administrative, logistic, and maintenance support to the Army reserve. The major tenant is the 716th petroleum supply company. There 2re over 600 part-time Army Reserve positions on Caven Point USARC. The Army recommends closure of this site.

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), WV

Valley Grove AMSA is located in Valley Grove, WV and consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of leased maintenance facilities. The primary mission of Valley Grove AhfS.4 is to provide maintenance support to Army Reserve activities. The only tenant is AMSA There are 7 fulltime civilian positions on Valley Grove AMSA. The Army recommends closure of this site.

The Army discontinued its study of the following, minor sites:

Fort Worden Cemetery, **WA**

Army cemeteries are not excess to the Army and are not reusable. The proposed transfer of this facility to the Department of Veterans Affairs will be considered outside of the BRAC process.

Fort Stevens Cemetery, **OR**

Army cemeteries are not excess to the Army and are not reusable. The proposed transfer of this facility to the Department of Veterans Affairs will be considered outside of the BRAC process.

Bothell **Army** Reserve Center, WA

Bothell Army Reserve Center is being transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) outside of the BRAC process. No closure or realignment action is necessary.

Defense Support Activity Boston, MA

The Defense Support Activity Boston is not excess to the Army. The tenant organizations are geographically linked to the Boston area and must remain in Boston. The proposed transfer of property to another military department (Navy is the primary tenant) is an internal DoD management action.

Ravenna **Army** Ammunition Plant, OH

Ravenna AAP stores and distributes ammunition components to active ammunition plants and provides storage for national strategic stocks. Closure would necessitate the removal of the these stocks at an estimated cost of 30 million dollars. The return on investment is 16 years and was not considered economical.

P. UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE.

The mission of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) is to prepare trained and ready forces capable of supporting the total force and the nation. Accomplishment of this mission requires modem and efficient facilities capable of supporting required training. The USAR occupies a total of 1,501 separate facilities in 899 communities nation-wide. Approximately one-third of these are leased facilities. The remaining government owned facilities provide 72% of the total amount of space required.

(1) Description of USAR Facilities.

(a) Reserve Center.

(1) U.S. Army Reserve Center. The Reserve Center provides a place to house and train Army reservists. The typical facility consists of two major components, training center and maintenance support facility. The training center generally consists of four functional areas. administration, assembly hall, classroom, and storage. Supporting the functional areas are general and special support areas such as arms vaults and kitchens. Maintenance support facilities may consist of an organizational maintenance shop, an area maintenance support activity, or an equipment concentration site, or any combination of these facilities. Maintenance facilities are further described below.

(2) Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC). The AFRC houses and trains reserve component personnel of two or more armed services. The typical facility is organized in a manner similar to a reserve center. The Army Reserve may be the host or the tenant.

(b) Readiness/Training Areas.

(1) Local Training Area (LTA). The LTA provides sustainment training for individual and collective tasks under realistic field environments and prepares units for Annual Training **(AT)** exercises and mobilization.

(2) Regional Training Site - Intelligence (RTS-I). The RTS-I provides centralized, regional hands-on intelligence sustainment training for individual soldiers and USAR intelligence units on mission essential tasks, using situational training exercises and other available training tools.

(3) Regional Training Site - Maintenance (RTS-Maint). The RTS-Maint provides centralized, regional hands-on maintenance sustainment training for individual soldiers and USAR maintenance units. It enables reserve personnel to operate and maintain current and force modernization equipment and systems.

(4) Regional Training Site - Medical (RTS-Med). The RTS-Med provides centralized, regional hands-on medical sustainment training for individual soldiers and USAR medical units,

and provides expert subject matter support during evaluation of these units. In addition, the RTS-Med develops and distributes exportable medical training packages, evaluates medical equipment within the research and development system for use in medical units, and provides direct and general medical maintenance support. This activity also has the capability of becoming a functional 400-bed hospital in the event of a natural disaster or mobilization.

(c) Maintenance Facilities

(1) Organizational Maintenance Shop (OMS). The OMS is used for the organizational maintenance of units' assigned equipment and is located at or near the reserve center when possible. Each unit with more than 10 vehicles authorized at the home station will include an OMS, provided the units are authorized mechanics by an approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances **(TDA).** The OMS is also used as a training facility for unit maintenance personnel and as a backup training area for other unit personnel during inclement weather.

(2) Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA). The **AMSA** performs organizational maintenance on equipment issued or loaned to the USAR which cannot be accomplished by assigned unit maintenance personnel in an OMS during regularly scheduled training assemblies. Staffed by fill time civilian personnel, AMSAs maintain administrative records, repair parts, supply and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) for supported equipment as well as perform limited direct support maintenance when authorized by the **U.S** Army Reserve Command (USARC) or the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). **AMSA** technicians also train unit maintenance personnel, provide contract maintenance teams, and conduct technical maintenance inspections. The AMSA is a TDA activity that supports ground and/or watercraft equipment.

(3) Equipment Concentration Site (ECS). The ECS receives, stores, and issues unit equipment for use in support of weekend unit training, annual training, mobilization, and contingency plans. ECS personnel also perform operator and unit maintenance for equipment assigned to the ECS and not in the hands of the using units. Limited direct and general support maintenance can be performed by the ECS when authorized by the USARC or USARPAC. Hand receipts, supply and equipment utilization records are located at and maintained by the ECS.

(4) Aviation Support Facility (ASF). The ASF provides centralized control and supervision of operations and maintenance of USAR aviation assets within the geographic area assigned to each Major U.S. Army Reserve Command (MUSARC). The **ASF** also conducts individual aviation military occupational specialty training and provides aviation maintenance support which cannot be accomplished by the supported USAR units during regularly scheduled training assemblies or which is beyond the capability of the supported units. The **ASF** may perform limited aviation intermediate maintenance when authorized by the USARC or USARPAC. The ASF may also provide administrative space and serve as a reserve center for assigned aviation units.

(d) Command and Control Sites.

The command and control sites include the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) and the Full Time Management Support Center (FTSMC). The USARC is the senior Army Reserve command and is responsible for providing command and control to nearly all Army Reserve units. This command does not control Army Reserve special operations units, or any units stationed outside the continental United States with the exception of Puerto Rico. ARPERCEN maintains the military records for all active and retired reservists not in troop program units. FTSMC manages the active guard/reserve personnel which support USAR units and activities on a ongoing basis.

(e) Miscellaneous Sites

(1) Storage Facilities. Storage facilities provide indoor and outdoor areas to store all types of military equipment. These usually are collocated with other USAR facilities. However, they can be stand-alone properties.

(2) Other Facilities. These facilities include properties pending disposition, land on which construction is planned, parking areas, other facilities needed to make up for a shortage of space at an existing activity, and land leases.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

In selecting reserve sites for closure or realignment, the Army developed a data call based on DoD selection criteria and tailored to reserve component requirements. Used in conjunction with various centralized data bases, including the Engineer Management Automation and Army Reserve Real Estate Module, the data collected was used to determine if a closure, realignment or enclave would be appropriate.

MEASURE OF MERIT	QUESTION
Mission Requirements	- Will any units deactivate (and vacate) within 5 years? - Will any units activate to occupy within 5 years? - How many (by type) organizations does the facility support? - Are there Contingency Force Pool (CFP) 1-7 units at this facility?
Mission Suitability	- Does the functional layout meet training/maintenance/storage requirements of tenants? - What is the percentage! of over utilization? - Is the facility in poor condition or in an undesirable location? - Is there land available ffor future expansion? - Is the facility government owned/leased? - What is the annual cost of leased facility?

Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force Requirements	- Does the local area transportation network facilitate the tenants movement to/from existing location? - Does the facility location promote efficient conduct of training? - What is the travel distance? - Is equipment (training sets) available at existing facility?
Cost and Manpower Implications	- What is the yearly budget for manpower support? - How much does it cost to maintain this facility annually? - How many fulltime personnel work in the facility? - What is the total manpower the facility supports?

(3) Installation Screening.

Reserve units are stationed to maximize recruiting and supporting demographics. Transfer of reserve units from one locale to another negatively affects unit readiness, since unit members can not readily relocate as in the case of the active component. Accordingly, the Army limited its survey to sites within 50 miles of active component study candidates.

(4) Recommendations and Justification.

The Army is recommending the closure of several reserve component properties. See Section O, Minor Sites for further details. For all recommendations, the Army carefully examined whether retention of a reserve enclave was necessary. See Chapter 4 for details.

In accordance with Army Regulations (AR 140-483 and AR 405-90, Disposal of Real Estate), the Army Reserve continually declares government properties excess through the *Corps* of Engineers to the General Service Administration. Leases usually can be canceled with minimal notice and no penalty fee. The Chief, Army Reserve directed lease costs be reduced by $3 million per year. To meet this goal, facility reviews are ongoing. As units migrate to the National Guard or are dropped from the force structure, facilities will be excessed and leases will be canceled.

Q. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) consists of approximately 1,969 units. These units and their subordinate activities are located in 2,702 communities in all states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Each state's or territorial National Guard is both a military force under the command of the respective state or territorial governor and a part of the Federal Reserve components. Individual adjutants general (TAGs) supervise the **54** National Guards. To support and train this force, the ARNG operates some 3,306 facilities under the supervision and management of the respective TAGs. These installations range in size from temporary 1,200 square foot Alaska Scout Armories to major maneuver training areas.

(I) Description **of** ARNG Facilities.

(a) Eighty-eight percent of ARNG installations are state owned. The ARNG also operates leased, licensed, or permitted real estate and facilities from the Army and other DoD and governmental agencies. Although most ARNG facilities are stand-alone installations in local communities, many are also located on active installations as tenant activities. The types of training facilities and installations are discussed below.

(b) Armories. The National Guard Armory provides a place to assemble and train National Guard personnel. Armories are generally referred to as Garrison Training Areas (GTA). The GTA is the lowest organized training site where individual hands-on equipment training, by day and night, in all weather conditions, and low-level collective training is conducted. Armories consist of administrative, classroom, open training, and unit storage areas. Additionally, the Armory/GTA could include scaled ranges and training aids, devices, simulation and simulators to assist in the sustainment of individual, crew, team, and staff proficiency. The ARNG operates 3,035 armories.

(c) Readiness/Training Areas. Readiness/Training Areas are grouped into Local Training Areas (LTA) and Major Training Areas (MTA).

(1) Local Training Areas. The LTA is the second echelon in the family of National Guard training sites above the GTA (Armory). The LTA provides facilities and realistic individual and collective training up to team/platoon levels. The LTA is designed to provide maximum sustainment training for mission essential tasks, Soldiers Manual critical tasks, ARTEP Skills, and Standards in Weapons Training requirements for using units. The LTA should be located within a two hour, one-way commuting distance from the GTA *(Armory)*. The LTA is primarily used to support Inactive Duty Training (IDT) performed over a weekend (referred to as drills). The *ARNG* operates 155 LTAs.

(2) Major Training Areas. The MTA is the highest training echelon of the National Guard's interlocking training strategy. It provides the capability and facilities to exercise company,

battalion, and brigade units using full caliber ranges or Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) enhanced maneuver, both day and night. The **MTA** may permit live firing of support weapons, to include close air support; and permits Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) functions to be included fully in a battlefield environment. The MTA is used for Annual Training (AT) as well as IDT. The MTA should be located within one day's travel of using units. The *ARNG* operates 60 MTA's.

(d) Regional Training Sites (RTS). The RTS provides a central, regional hands-on sustainment and modernization training site for individual soldiers and units. The RTS provides MOSQ, NCOES, sustainment, transition, and additional skill identifier training for *ARNG* soldiers. The *ARNG* currently operates 13 RTS-Maintenance and *2* RTS-Medical sites.

(e) Logistical Sites. Properties/training sites where the predominant organization provides maintenance support. These National Guard maintenance support organizations include:

(1) Combined Support Maintenance Shops (CSMS). CSMS perform direct and general support maintenance of specified surface equipment for *ARNG* units and for any DoD agency when so authorized by the Chief, National Guard Bureau; or as negotiated for USAR support. The ARNG operates 70 CSMS.

(2) Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites (MATES). MATES receives, stores, maintains, and issues unit MTOE equipment. It maintains organizational integrity of all stored equipment and performs maintenance that cannot be performed by the supported unit. Equipment from other states may be stored and maintained by mutual agreement of the State Adjutant General concerned when approved by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. The *ARNG* operates *22* MATES.

(3) Unit Training Equipment Sites (UTES). UTES receives, stores, maintains, and issues equipment to supported units authorized for use during AT and IDT. It maintains organizational identity of all stored equipment and performs maintenance which cannot be performed by the supported units. Operations are supervised by a designated parent unit. The *ARNG* operates 38 UTES.

(4) Organizational Maintenance Shops (OMS). OMS performs organizational maintenance on Federal equipment which cannot be accomplished by supported units during IDT and AT. Shops are under the direct technical supervision of the State Organizational Maintenance Officer and under administrative supervision of the Command Administrative Assistant of the parent unit Parent unit provides shop tools and test equipment required. The *ARNG* operates some 703 OMS.

(5) Army Aviation Facilities. The ARNG operates some 175 aviation facilities. These include Army Aviation Support Facilities (AASF), Army Aviation Operating Facilities (AAOF), and

Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depots (AVCRAD). These facilities provide an entire spectrum of aviation command and control, operations, training, and mainienance capabilities.

(f) Command and Control Sites. Command and Control sites are those National Guard facilities/installations where the predominant user is a command or administrative activity.

(1) State Area Command (STARC). The STARC is both the peacetime and mobilization command, control, and administrative headquarters for all National Guard units assigned within a state.

(2) United States Property and Fiscal Office(USP&FO). The USP&FO manages and directs the administration, coordination, planning, development, fiscal, procurement, data processing. internal review, and facilities management for both the Army and Air National Guard. The USP&FO consults with the National Guard Bureau concerning the allocation, obligation, and expenditure of federal resources in support of federal missions and state missions authorized federal support

(2) Military Value Assessment.

The vast majority of ARNG facilities are single purpose, stand-alone facilities. The number, diversity, and dispersion of ARNG installations within the **54** National Guards does not readily lend itself to modeling, nor the identification and measurement of specific, discrete attributes.

Each TAG determines the military value of his installations based on the requirements for maintaining the mobilization readiness of assigned units. Those installations and facilities no longer required to support the readiness of the ARNG are identified as excess and closed.

(3) Installation Screening.

(a) Installations were screened in a two phase process. First, the Army reviewed all facilities under license, permit, or executive order to the ARNG within 50 miles of all Army facilities studied in BRAC 95. Second, the Army reviewed all Major Training Areas (MTA) for impact on the ARNG.

(b) The first phase of the analysis focused on federally owned real estate or facilities under license, permit, or executive order within a 50 **mile:** radius of all installations studied in BRAC 95. This did not include all *ARNG* facilities on active installations, leased facilities, or other non-Army federal facilities. Facility requirements were determined using the FY94 *ARNG* force structure.

(c) This assessed category consists of 56 properties. Each of the properties was analyzed for possible closure or consolidation onto active installations being studied by the Army; however, the assessment was limited to the following major types of facilities: Armory, Regional Training Sites, Logistical/Maintenance Sites, Command and Control Sites, and Miscellaneous Sites.

- 38 Armories

- 5 Regional Training Sites

- 5 Logistical / Maintenance Sites

- 0 Command and Control Sites

- 8 Miscellaneous Sites

(d) All the assessed properties fall below BRAC thresholds. The Army may close them without following the procedures of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. Cost reductions, without adverse impacts on ARNG unit readiness, are achieved though the efficient management of installation and facility infrastructure. **As** force structure changes occur, and specific unit inactivations are determined, the ARNG is able to identify potential candidates for realignment or closure.

(e) All existing facilities directly support the ARNG missions of manning, equipping, maintaining, training, and mobilizing combat ready units.

(f) Accessibility and modernization of training facilities arid supporting infrastructure is an imperative for mission readiness of the Army National Guard,

(g) The second assessed category consisted of the 10 Major Training Areas (MTAs) the Army currently operates. Eight of the MTAs operated by the Army were studied; all are used primarily by the Reserve Components for Annual Training and In-Active Duty training. The Army National Guard reviewed each installation to see if there was an impact on *ARNG* training and readiness.

(h) The Annual Training **(AT)** capacity analysis (TRAINLOAD) indicated one or more MTAs could be closed without degrading the training site availability for RC Annual Training. This screening process does not consider In-Active Duty training (IDT) and the additional hardship it will cause ARNG units to find adequate training areas within the allowable travel time. Maneuver training will become even a bigger problem throughout the Army as the ARNG converts to heavy forces. The distances to alternative sites consumes training time and travel costs become prohibitive. Retaining land is cost effective because only a limited amount of infrastructure and resources are required to operate austere maneuver areas and ranges. The Army has chosen to retain much of the maneuver land in reserve component enclaves for installations being recommended for closure.

(4) Recommendations.

There are no recommended realignments or closures among federally owned facilities or those under license, permit, or executive ordered to the Army National Guard. The Army carefully considered the needs of the Army National Guard for each of the recommendations presented in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS
INDEX

Aviation-Troop Command, MO

1. Recommendation: Disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), and close by relocating its missions/functions as follows:

- Relocate Aviation Research, Development & Engineering Center, Aviation Management, and Aviation Program Executive Offices to Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, to form the Aviation & Missile Command.
- Relocate functions related to soldier systems to Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center, **MA,** to align with the Soldier Systems Command.
- Relocate functions related to materiel management of communications-electronics to Fort Monmouth, NJ, to align with Communications-Electronics Command.
- Relocate automotive materiel management functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI, to align with Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.

2. Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

In 1991, the Commission approved the merger of Aviation Systems Command and Troop Systems Command (ATCOM). It also recommended that the Army evaluate the relocation of these activities from leased space to government-owned facilities and provide appropriate recommendations to a subsequent Commission. In 1993, the Army studied the possibility of relocating ATCOM to a military installation and concluded it would be too costly. It is evident that restructuring ATCOM now provides a financially attractive opportunity to relocate.

Significant functional efficiencies are also possible by separating aviation and troop support commodities and relocating these functions to military installations. The aviation support functions realign to Redstone Arsenal to form a new Aviation & Missiles Command. The troop support functions realign to Natick, MA to align with the new Soldier Systems Command.

This recommendation preserves crucial research and development functions while optimizing operational efficiencies. Moving elements of ATCOM to Natick and Redstone Arsenal improves the synergistic effect of research, development and engineering, by facilitating the interaction between the medical, academic, and industrial communities already present in these regions. Vacating the St. Louis lease will collocate/consolidate similar life cycle functions at military installations for improved efficiencies and effectiveness.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is **$146** million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $9 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are **$46** million with a return on investment expected in **3** years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of **$453** million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,679 **jobs (4,731** direct **jobs** and **2,948** indirect **jobs)** over the 1996-to-2001 period in the St. Louis, MO-IL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.5 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period couid result in a maximum potential decrease equal to - 0.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installations.

East Fort Baker, CA

1. Recommendation: Close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.

2. Justification: East Fort Baker is at the north end of the Golden Gate Bridge in Marin County, CA. The post consists of approximately **347** acres and 390,000 square feet of facilities. It provides facilities and housing for the Headquarters, 91st Training Division (U.S. Army Reserve) and the 6th Recruiting Brigade, Army Recruiting Command. The 91st Training Division has a requirement to remain in the San Francisco Bay area, while the 6th Recruiting Brigade has a regional mission associated with the western United States. Both the 6th Recruiting Brigade and the 91st Training Division can easily relocate to other installations. The 91st Training Division will relocate to Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, where it beiter aligns with its training mission. Closing East Fort Baker saves operations and support costs by consolidating tenants to other military installations without major construction.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $8 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $1 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are **$2** million with a return on investment expected in 5 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $ 15 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this reconmendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 152 jobs ***(97*** direct jobs and 55 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Francisco, CA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.5 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ

1. Recommendation: Close Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. Relocate the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Retain an enclave for the Navy Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, and Navy Resale and Fashion Distribution Center.

2. Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The primary mission of Bayonne is the shipment of general bulk cargo. It has no capability to ship bulk munitions. There are sufficient commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts to support power projection requirements with a minimal loss to operational capability. Bayonne provides the Army with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is **$44** million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $10 million with a return on investment expected in 5 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $90 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,105 jobs (1,367 direct jobs and 738 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Jersey City, NJ Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY

1. Recommendation: Close Bellmore Logistics Activity.

2. Justification: Bellmore Logistics Activity, located on Long Island, consists of approximately 17 acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It formerly provided maintenance and logistical support to Reserve Component units. Since Reserve Components no longer use Bellmore Logistics Activity, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Bellmore Logistics Activity will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities

3. Return on Investment: There is no one-time:cost **to** implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $5 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Nassau-Suffolk, NY Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Big Coppett Key, FL

1. **Recommendation:** Close Big Coppett Key.

2. Justification: Big Coppett Key, an island near Key West, consists of approximately **5** acres and 3,000 square feet of facilities. Big Coppett Key formerly provided communications support to United States Army. Since the Army no longer uses Big Coppett Key, it is excess and to Army requirements. Closing Big Coppett Key will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

3. Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $0.05 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.01 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of SO.1 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Monroe County, FL area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Camp Bonneville, WA

1. Recommendation: Close Camp Bonneville.

2. Justification: Camp Bonneville consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 178,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Camp Bonneville is to provide training facilities for Active and Reserve units Training currently conducted at Camp Bonneville will be shifted to Fort Lewis, Washington Accordingly, Camp Bonneville is excess to the Army's requirements Closing the camp will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $0 04 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $0.8 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $0.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $2 million.

4. **Impacts:** This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, CA

1. Recommendation: Close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, CA.

2. Justification: Branch USDB, Lompoc consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 812,000 square feet of detention facilities. It is permitted to and operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army activities on USDB., Lompoc. .Accordingly, it is excess to the Army's requirements.

3. Return on **Investment:** There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. There are no costs and savings during the implementation period. There are no annual recurring savings after implementation. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of SO million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA area. There are no 'known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Fort **Buchanan, PR**

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Buchanan by reducing gamson management functions and disposing of family housing Retain an enclave for the reserve components, Army 2nd Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School.

2. Justification: Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, provides administrative. logistical and mobilization support to Army units and activities in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region. Tenants include a U.S. Army Reserve headquarters, AAFES and a DoD-operated school complex. Although the post is managed by an active component gamson, it supports relatively few active component tenants. The family housing will close. The activities providing area support will relocate to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base and other sites The Army intends to license buildings to the Army National Guard, that they currently occupy.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $74 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $50 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $10 million with a return on investment expected in 7 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of **$45** million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of **289** jobs (1**82** direct **jobs** and 107 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Juan, PR area which represents 0.4 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Caven Point Army Reserve Center, NJ

1. Recommendation: Close Caven Point U. S. Army Reserve Center. Relocate its reserve activities to the Fort Hamilton, ***NY,*** provided the recommendation to realign Fort Hamilton is approved.

2. Justification: Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center (USARC) is located near Jersey City, NJ, and consists of approximately 45,000 square feet of administrative and maintenance facilities on 35 acres. It is overcrowded and in generally poor condition. The primary mission of Caven Point USARC is to provide administrative, logistics and maintenance support to the Army Reserve. The consolidation of tenants from Caven Point USARC with Reserve Component activities remaining on Fort Hamilton will achieve savings in operations costs.

3. Return on Investment: The cost and savings information for the closure of Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center is included in the recommendation for Fort Hamilton, ***NY.***

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Jersey City, NJ, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.8 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Chaffee, AR

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, La. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $10 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $13 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $167 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.4 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installation.

Concepts Analysis Agency, MD

1. Recommendation: Close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, **VA**

2. Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned space.

Since Army studies indicate that space is available at Fort Belvoir, the Concepts Analysis Agency can easily relocate with limited renovation. The annual cost of the current lease is $1.5 million.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is **$3.7** million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $0.4 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.8 million with a return on investment expected in 5 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $7 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installation.

Detroit Arsenal, MI

I. Recommendation: Realign Detroit Arsenal by closing and disposing of the Detroit Army Tank Plant.

2. Justification: Detroit Tank Plant, located on Detroit Arsenal, is one of two Army Government Owned, Contractor Operated tank production facilities. **A** second facility is located at Lima, Ohio (Lima Army Tank Plant). The Detroit plant is not as technologically advanced as the Lima facility and is not configured for the latest tank production. Moreover, retaining the plant as a "rebuild" facility is not practical since Anniston Arrny Depot is czpable of rebuilding and repairing the M1 Tank and its principal components. Accordingly, the Detroit Tank Plant is excess to Army requirements.

3. Return **on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of **$8** million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of **$38** million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Detroit, MI Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning site.

Fort Dix, NJ

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component gamson with a U.S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

This proposal retains facilities and training areas essential to support Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units in the Mid-Atlantic states. However, it reduces base operations and real property maintenance costs by eliminating excess facilities. Additionally, this reshaping will truly move Fort Dix into a preferred role of RC support. It retains an Army Reserve garrison to manage Fort Dix and provides a base to support RC logistical requirements. The Army intends to continue the Army National Guard's current license of buildings.

Various U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve activities regularly train at Fort Dix. The post houses the National Guard High Technology 'Training Center, a unique facility providing state of the art training devices for guardsmen and reservists in a 12 state area. Fort Dix's geographic proximity to a large portion of the nation's RC forces and the air and seaports of embarkation make it one of the most suitable RC Major Training Areas in the United States. This recommendation is consistent with the decision of the 1991 Commission, but better aligns the operation of the installation with its users.

3. Return **on** Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $19 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $1 12 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are **$38** million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $478 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,164 jobs (739 direct jobs and **425** indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, PA-NJ Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -1.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Dugway **Proving** Ground, UT

1. Recommendation: Realign Dugway Proving Ground by relocating the smoke and obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, and some elements of chemical/biological research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Dispose of English Village and retain test and experimentation facilities necessary to support Army and DoD missions.

2. Justification: Dugway is low in military value compared to other proving grounds. Its test facilities conduct both open air and laboratory chemical/biological testing in support of various Army and DoD missions. The testing is important as are associated security and safety requirements. However, this recommendation enables the Army to continue these important missions and also reduce costly overhead at Dugway.

Yuma can assume Dugway's programmed smoke and obscurant testing. Aberdeen Proving Ground can accept the laboratory research and development portion of the chemical/biological mission from Dugway, since it is currently performing chemical and biological research in facilities that carry equivalent bio/safety levels. Open air and simulant testing missions will remain at Dugway.

The State of Utah has expressed an interest in using English Village and associated firing and training ranges at Dugway for the National Guard, including the establishment of an artillery training facility.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is *$25* million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $61 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $26 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $307 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,715 jobs (1,096 direct jobs and 619 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Tooele County, UT area, which represents 13.0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -36.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO

1. Recommendation: Close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except for Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate the Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston. Relocate Civilan Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space. Relocate other tenants to other installations.

2. Justification: FAMC is low in military value compared to other medical centers. This recommendation avoids anticipated need for estimated $245 million construction to replace FAMC while preserving health care services through other more cost-effective means. This action will offset any loss of medical services through: phased-in CHAMPUS and Managed Care Support contracts; increased services at Fort Carson and US Air Force Academy; and redistribution of Medical Center patient load from Region Eight to other Medical Centers. FAMC is not collocated with a sizable active component population. Its elimination does not jeopardize the Army's capability to surge to support two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies, nor limit the Army's capability to provide wartime medical support in the theater of operations. Closure of this medical center allows redistribution of medical military personnel to other medical centers to absorb the diverted medical center patient load. These realignments avoid a significant cost of continuing to operate and maintain facilities at this stand-alone medical center. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Military Treatment Facilities supports the closure of Fitzsimons.

3. Return on Investment: For the Army, the total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $103 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $179 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $84 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $983 million. For DoD, the total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $142 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $34 million with a return on investment expected in 3 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $299 million.

4. Imparts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,489 jobs (2,904 direct jobs and 1,586 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Denver, CO Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.4 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.8 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Greely, AK

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

2. Justification: Fort Greely currently supports two tenant activities (CRTA and NWTC) and manages training areas for maneuver and range firing. Over 662,000 acres of range and training areas are used by both the Army and the Air Force. These valuable training lands will be retained.

The Army has recently reduced the NWTC by over half its original size and transferred oversight responsibilities to the U.S Army, Pacific. The garrison staff will reduce in size and continue to support the important testing and training missions. The Army intends to use Fort Wainwright as the base of operations (107 miles away) for these activities, and "safari" them to Fort Greely as necessary. This allows the Army to reduce its presence at Fort Greely, reduce excess capacity and perform essential missions at a much lower cost. The Army intends to retain facilities at Bolio Lake (for CRTA), Black Rapids (for NWTC), Allen Army Airfield, and minimal necessary gamson facilities to maintain the installation for contingency missions.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is *$23* million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $43 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $19 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of *$225* million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 969 jobs (724 direct jobs and 245 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Southeast Fairbanks Census Area, AK, which represents 36.3 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Hamilton, NY

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Hamilton. Dispose of all family housing. Retain minimum essential land and facilities for existing Army units and activities. Relocate all Army Reserve units from Caven Point, New Jersey, to Fort Hamilton.

2. Justification: Fort Hamilton is low in military value compared to the other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for additional growth or military development. No new or additional missions are planned.

This proposal reduces the size of Fort Hamilton by about one-third to support necessary military missions in the most cost effective manner. The New York Area Command, which includes protocol support to the United Nations, will remain at Fort Hamilton. Another installation will assume the area support currently provided to the New York area.

The Armed Forces Reserve Center at Caven Point was built in 1941. Its sole mission is to support reserve! component units. The buildings on the 35 acre parcel are in poor condition. Relocating to Fort Hamilton will allow the Army Reserve to eliminate operating expenses in excess of S100 thousand per year.

3. Return **on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $3 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $7 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of **$74** million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 85 jobs (52 direct jobs and **33** indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the New York, NY, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Hingham Cohasset, MA

1. Recommendation: Close Hingham Cohasset.

2. Justification: Hingham Cohasset, formerly a U.S. Army Reserve Center. is essentially vacant and is excess to the Amy's requirements. The site consists of approximately 1[illegible]5 acres and 150,000 square feet of facilities. Closing Hingham Cohasset will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

3. Return on Investment: There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.2 million with an immediate return on investment The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $2 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence-Lowell-Brockton, MA-NH New England County Metropolitan Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Fort Hunter Liggett, **CA**

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).

2. Justification: Fort Hunter Liggett is low in military value compared to other major training area installations and has few Active Component tenants. Relocation of the Test and Experimentation Center optimizes the unique test capabilities afforded by Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.

Fort Hunter Liggett's maneuver space is key to Reserve Component training requirements. Since it is a primary maneuver area for mechanized units in the western United States, retention of its unique training lands is essential.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $12 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $5 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $64 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 686 jobs (478 direct jobs and 208 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Salinas, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.3 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installation.

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill 2nd Fort Drum

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for $1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $13 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $67 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $23 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $285 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs (521 direct jobs and ***268*** indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Hamsburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, **PA** Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.2 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), VA

1. Recommendation: Close by relocating Information Systems Software Command to Fort Meade, MD.

2. Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. The annual cost of the current lease is *$2* million.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of **$2** million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $1 million with a return on investment expected in 6 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $8 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installation.

Kelly Support Center, **PA**

1. Recommendation: Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance activity in Valley Grove, West Virginia to the Kelly Support Center.

2. Justification: Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort Drum, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property.

The Kelly Support Center is last in military valve compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills It possesses no permanent facilities or mobilization capability.

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet of semi-permanent structures, from the Army's inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group Pittsburgh.

Relocating the Army's Reserve activity from Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with its parent unit and saves $28,000 per year in lease costs.

3. Return **on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $36 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of **$22** million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $5 million with a return on investment expected in 6 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $28 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 209 jobs (128 direct jobs and 81 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, & Westmoreland Counties, PA, area which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, & Westmoreland Counties because all affected jobs will remain in that area.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-ZOO1 period could result in a **maximum** potential decrease equal to -0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Camp Kilmer, NJ

1. Recommendation: Close Camp Kilmer, except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve Components.

2. Justification: Camp Kilmer consists of approximately **75** acres and **33** 1,000 square feet of facilities. The camp provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of the site is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Camp Kilmer will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 56 acres.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is SO.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.2 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $3 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort **Lee, VA**

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

2. Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Lee, VA by eliminating inpatient services at Kenner Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other nearby military medical activites and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are **$4** million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $51 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of **321** jobs (205 direct jobs and 116 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Richmond-Petersburg, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.1 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Letterkenny **Army** Depot, **PA**

1. Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transfemng the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage. Change the 1993 Commission's decision regarding the consolidating of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot.

2. Justification: Letterkenny Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Letterkenny receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. **A** review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. The heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston cannot be absorbed at Letterkenny without major construction and facility renovations. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Letterkenny into the two the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Letterkenny is supported by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

The Army's recommendation to transfer missile workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot preserves Letterkenny's missile disassembly and storage mission. It capitalizes on Tobyhanna's electronics focus and retains DoD missile system repair at a single Army depot.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $50 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $207 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $78 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $952 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,126 jobs (2,090 direct jobs and 2,036 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Franklin County, **PA** area, which represents 6.6 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC acticns in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -8.5 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort McClellan, AL

I. Recommendation: Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot. Relocate the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri upon receipt of the required permits. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard.

2. Justification: This closure recommendation is based upon the assumption that requisite permits can be granted to allow operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Governor of the State of Missouri has indicated that an expeditious review of the permit application can be accomplished.

Collocation allows the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter- drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

This recommendation differs from the Army's prior closure recommendations submitted to the 1991 and 1993 Commissions. The Army will relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By relocating the CDTF, the Army can continue providing live-agent training to **all** levels of command. The Army is the only Service that conducts live agent training, and it will continue this training at Fort Leonard Wood.

The Army has considered the use of some Fort McClellan assets for support of the chemical demilitarization mission at Anniston Army Depot. The Army will use the best available assets to provide the necessary support to Anniston's demilitarization mission.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $259 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $122 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are **$45** million with a return on investment expected in 6 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $3 16 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10,720jobs **(8,563** direct jobs and 2,184 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Anniston, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 17.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC *95* recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -14.7 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installatians.

Fort Meade, MD

1. Recommendation: Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

2. Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Sewice Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $4 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $50 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 203 jobs (129 direct jobs and 74 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Fort Missoula, **MT**

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Missoula, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Component units,.

2. Justification: Fort Missoula consists of approximately **35** acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The post also provides facilities for the United Stated Forest Service. Fort Missoula has land and facilities excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Fort Missoula will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately *25* acres. The Army intends to continue to license buildings and land currently occupied by the Army National Guard.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $0.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $0.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.2 million with a return on investment expected in *2* years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $2 million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Missoula County, MT area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Camp Pedricktown, NJ

1. Recommendation: Close Camp Pedricktown, except the Sievers-Sandberg Reserve Center

2. Justification: Camp Pedricktown consists of approximately **82** acres and 260,000 square feet of facilities. Its primary mission is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of Camp Pedricktown's land and facilities are excess to Army requirements. Closing it will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 60 acres.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is SO.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $2 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $0.4 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of **$5** million.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Philadelphia, PA-NJ Primary hfetropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Fort Pickett, **VA**

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort **Dix,** NJ.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has reduced its active and reserve forces considerably. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

Fort Pickett is very low in military value compared to other major training area installations. It has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for reserve units that now use Fort Pickett can be conducted easily at other installations in the region, including Fort Bragg, Fort A.P. Hill and Camp Dawson. The Army intends to license required facilities and training areas to the Army National Guard.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $41 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $21 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $241 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 362 jobs (254 direct jobs and 108 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Nottoway & Dinwiddie Counties, **VA** area, which represents 0.8 percent of the area's employment, There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Price Support Center, IL

1. Recommendation: Close Charles Melvin Price Support Center, except a small reserve enclave and a storage area.

2. Justification: Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides area support and military housing to the Army and other Federal activities in the St. Louis, MO area. It is low in military value compared to similar installations. Its tenants, including a recruiting company and a criminal investigative unit, can easily relocate.

This recommendation is related to the Army's recommendation to relocate Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM) from St. Louis, MO to other locations. A reduction in the Army's presence in the area warrants a corresponding reduction in Charles Melvin Price Support Center.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is **$4** million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of **S35** million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the cost!; and savings over 20 years is a savings of $1 16 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, **this** recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 363 **jobs** (225 direct **jobs** and 138 indirect **jobs)** over the 1996-to-2001 period in the St. Louis, MO-IL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.6 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations,

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD

1. Recommendation: Close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.

2. Justification: Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis combines the wholesale and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. **The** consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one less costly lease.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of **$3** million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $3 million with a return on investment expected in 2 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of S35 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 213 jobs (131 direct jobs and 82 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving sites.

Recreation Center #2, NC

1. **Recommendation:** Close Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC.

2. Justification: Recreation Center #2 consists of approximately **4** acres and 17,000 square feet of community facilities. Recreation Center #2 is currently being leased to the city of Fayetteville, NC, and is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Recreation Center #2 will provide reuse opportunities.

3. Return on Investment: There are no costs associated with this recommendation

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Fayetteville, NC Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site,

Red River Army Depot, TX

1. Recommendation: Close Red River Army Depot. Transfer the ammunition storage mission, intern training center, and civilian training education to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Transfer the light combat vehicle maintenance mission to Anniston Army Depot. Transfer the Rubber Production Facility to Lone Star.

2. Justification: Red River Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Red River receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. **A** review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. Without considerable and costly modifications, Red River cannot assume the heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston. Red River can not assume the DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation program from Letterkenny without major construction. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Red River into Anniston the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Red River is consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $60 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $313 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are **$123** million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over *20* years is a savings of $1,497 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 5,654 jobs (2,901 direct jobs and 2,753 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 9.5 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -7.7 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Rio Vista **Army** Reserve Center, **CA**

1. **Recommendation:** Close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

2. **Justification:** Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center, it is excess to the *Army's* requirements. Closing Rio Vista will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres,

3. **Return on Investment:** There is no one-time cost to implement this recommendation. The net of **all** costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $0.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $2 million.

4. **Impacts:** This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving sites,

Fort Ritchie, MD

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 111lth Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.

2. Justification: This recommendation assumes that base support for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to Fort Detrick will: (a) maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; (d) collocate signal units that were previously separated at two different gamsons; (e) consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations; and (f) provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements. These relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's gamson and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $93 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $83 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $65 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $712 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of **3,210** jobs **(2,344** direct jobs and 866 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Hagerstown, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 4.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL

1. Recommendation: Close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.

2. Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Anny plans to eliminate its stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Savartna Army Depot Activity is a Tier 3 depot.

USADACS performs the following basic functions: munitions training, logistics engineering, explosive safety, demilitarization research and development, technical assistance, and career management. Relocation of USADACS to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) allows it to collocate with an active ammunition storage and production operation. McAlester AAP, a Tier 1 depot, is the best for providing the needed capabilities.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $38 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $12 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $13 million with a return on investment expected in *2* years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $1 12 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of ***627*** jobs (450 direct jobs and **177** indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Carroll County, IL area, which represents 8.2 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI

1. Recommendation: Close U.S. Army Garrison, Selfridge:

2. Justification: Closing Selfridge eliminates an installation that exists primarily to provide housing for activities (predominantly Detroit Arsenal) located in the immediate area although such support can be provided through a less costly alternative. Sufficient commercial housing is available on the local economy for military personnel using Variable Housing Allowance/Basic Allowance for Quarters. Closure avoids the cost of continued operation and mzintenance of unnecessary support facilities. This recommendation will not degrade local military activities

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $47 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $10 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $140 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 867 jobs (536 direct jobs and 331 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Detroit, MI Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Seneca Army Depot, NY

1. Recommendation: Close Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to store hazardous material and ores.

2. Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered''ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Seneca Army Depot is a Tier 3 depot.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $15 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $34 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $21 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of 3242 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 463 jobs (325 direct jobs and 138 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Seneca County, NY area, which represents 3.2 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Sierra Army Depot, CA

1. Recommendation: Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage of ores.

2. Justification: This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1 - Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage: support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2 - Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3 - Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minima! staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army Depot is a Tier 3 Depot.

Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of Force Provider (550 man tent city), Inland Petroleum Distribution System; and Water Support System. It also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $14 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $55 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $29 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $333 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 839 jobs (592 direct jobs and 247 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Lassen County, CA area, which represents 7.4 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT

1. Recommendation: Close Stratford Army Engine Plant.

2. Justification: The Stratford facility has produced engines for heavy armor vehicles and rotary wing aircraft. Reduced production requirements and the Army's increased capability for rebuild and repair have eliminated the need for the Stratford Army Engine Plant. There is no requirement for use of the installation by either the active or reserve components.

The Army has an extensive capability to repair engines at Anniston and Corpus Christi Army Depots. The current inventory for these engines rneets projected operational requirements. During mobilization, the capability to rebuild engines can be increased at both depots. In the event of an extended national emergency that would deplete stocks, the depots could reconfigure to assemble new engines from parts provided by the manufacturer until mothballed facilities become operational. Prior to closing the facility, the contractor will complete all existing contracts.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $24 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $6 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $80 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3 jobs (2 direct jobs and 1 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fairfield County, CT area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site.

Sudbury Training Annex, MA

1. Recommendation: Close Sudbury Training Annex.

2. Justification: Sudbury Training Annex, outside Boston, consists of approximately 2,000 acres and 200,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Sudbury Training Annex is to provide storage facilities for various Department of Defense activities. Sudbury Training Annex is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the annex will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 2,000 acres.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $0.1 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are $0.1 million with a return on investment expected in 5 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $1 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 21 jobs (13 direct jobs and 8 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Essex-Middlesex-Suffolk-Plymouth and Norfolk Counties, MA, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving sites.

Fort Totten, NY

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Totten, except an enclave for the U. S. Army Reserve. Dispose of family housing.

2. Justification: Fort Totten, a sub-installation of Fort Hamilton, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in the New York City metropolitan area.

Fort Totten is low in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for growth or further military development.

Fort Totter] is home to the Ernie Pyle U.S. Army Reserve Center, the largest in the country. Realignment of the Center to nearby Fort Hamilton is not possible since Fort Hamilton has little available space Therefore, the Army decided to retain this facility as a reserve enclave.

3. Return **on** Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of SO.1 million. Annual recumng savings after implementation are *$2* million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $17 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of *69* jobs **(43** direct jobs and *26* indirect jobs) over the *1996-to-2001* period in the New York, ***NY*** Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC *95* recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the *1994-to-ZOO1* period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

Tri-Service Project Reliance

1. Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, MD, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting nonmammalian toxicity assessment models and onsite biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command.

2. Justification: There are no operational advantages that accrue by relocating this activity to Wright-Patterson. Substantial resources were expended over the last 15 years to develop this unique laboratory currently used by researchers from across the DoD, other federal agencies and the academic community. No facilities are available at Wright-Patterson to accommodate this unique aquatic research activity, which supports environmental quality R&D initiatives developing cost effective alternatives to the use of mammalian species in toxicity testing. Significant new construction is required at Wright Patterson to duplicate facilities at Fort Detrick to continue this critical research. No construction is required at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Furthermore, the quality of water required for the culture of aquatic animals used in this research is not adequate at Wright-Patterson. This would necessitate additional construction and result in either several years of costly overlapping research in Maryland and Ohio, or the loss of over 10 years experience with the unique lab colonies used at Fort Detrick. The Navy and the Air Force agree that true research synergy is possible without executing the planned relocation.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $0.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $4 million. There are no annual recumng savings after implementation. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $4 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 15 jobs (9 direct jobs and 6 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. There are no known environmental impediments at the losing or receiving installations.

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV

1. Recommendation: Close Valley Grove Area hlaintenance Support Activity **(AMSA).** Relocate reserve activity to the Kelly Supprt Center, PA, provided the recommendation to realign Kelly Support Center is approved.

2. Justification: Valley Grove AMSA, located in Valley Grove, WV, consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of leased maintenance facilities. Its primary mission is to provide maintenance support to Army Reserve activities. Consolidating tenants from Valley Grove **AMSA** with the Reserve Component activities remaining on Kelly Support Center will reduce the cost of operation.

3. Return on **Investment:** The cost and savings information for the closure of Valley Grove AMSA is included in the recommendation for Charles E. Kelly Support Center.

4. Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Wheeling, WV-OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

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CHAPTER 5 - BUDGET IMPACT

A. FINANCIAL STRATEGY.

The Army of the 21st Century confronts difficult challenges and new opportunities. Force structure and mission requirements along with declining resources necessitate a reduction of excess infrastructure. Consistent with military value assessments, the Army adopted a BRAC financial strategy that emphasized low one-time implementation costs, high steady state savings, and long term investment.

B. ARMY RECOMMENDATION:

(1) Recommendation Statistics. The Army recommends closing or realigning 44 installations, including 3 leases and 15 minor sites. Since medical military construction and Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) costs are borne primarily by the Department of Defense (DoD), separate Army and DoD financial statistics are presented below:

	ARMY	DoD
1-TIME COST	$1.1 B	$1 1 B
RECURRING STEADY STATE SAVINGS (FY 02)	$725 M	$676M
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) #YEARS (YEAR)	IMMEDIATE (2000)	IMMEDIATE (2000)
NET **PRESENT** VALUE (20 YEARS)	$8.2 B	$7.5 B
PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE (PRV)	$14.1 B (9%)	$14.1 B (9%)

(2) Net Cash Flow. The net distribution of the above Army cost and savings over the implementation period of the POM is shown below:

FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01
$ 130M	$ 426 M	$ 148 M	- $527 M	- $678	- $ 701

C. SUMMARY.

These recommendations surpass all the Army's previous BRAC efforts combined. They cost less and save more. The Army estimates spending only one-third of what is being spent to implement three previous rounds. Yet by carefully selecting unneeded installations without jeopardizing those essential for the future, the Army expects to save 18% more than all previous rounds combined.

APPENDIX A - JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS OVERVIEW

***A*. Introduction.** The Army was a key participant in OSD's BRAC *95* effort to reduce excess infrastructure through workload consolidation and cross-service realignments Five functional Joint Cross-Senice Groups (JCSGs) under OSD staff leadership were formed in early 1994 to develop alternatives for service analysis and consideration. One JCSG focused on each of the following areas: Test and Evaluation, Laboratories, Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF), and Maintenance Depots.

The Joint Cross-Service Groups were tasked: to determine the common support functions and bases to be addressed by each cross-service group; to establish the guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements and milestone schedules for DoD Components to conduct of cross-service analyses of common support functions; to oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses of common support functions; to identify necessary outsourcing policies and make recommendations regarding those policies; to review excess capacity analyses, to develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration in such analyses; and to analyze cross-service trade-offs.

In December 1994 the JCSGs developed a set of alternatives for military department review. In accordance with OSD policy, the "losing" military department was responsible for calculating the cost and savings of the applicable workload shift or activity realignment. The "gaining" department was responsible for providing certified data to other departments affected by the option. This appendix provides an overview of the alternatives suggested by the JCSGs for which the Army was the losing department.

B. Test and Evaluation:

(I) **Focus.** The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (T&E JCSG) developed alternatives in three broad common support functions (CSFs). Each was further divided into a number of sub-functions.

Air Vehicles
- Avionics and Aircraft Subsystems
- Communication / Navigation / Antenna
- Environmental / Vibration / Structures
- Electro-Magnetic Environmental Effects
- Guidance / Sensor / Signature
- Propulsion
- Sled Tracks

Electronic Combat
- Communication / Antenna
- Environmental
- Electro-Magnetic Environmental Effects

Guidance
Radar Cross Section
Signature

Armaments / Weapons
Environmental / Vibration / Indoor Decoy Flares
Electro-Magnetic Environmental Effects
Guidance and Control / Seeker/Sensor / Signatures and Flares
Guns / Ordnance / Warheads / Outdoor Decoy Flares
Propulsion
Sled Tracks

(2) Affected Installations. The T&E JCSG evaluated data from the following Army installations and activities:

- Yuma Proving Ground, AZ
- Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, AZ
- Aviation Technical Test Center, Fort Rucker, AL
- Air Qualification Test Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base, CA
- Redstone Technical Test Center.,Redstone Arsenal, AL
- White Sands Missile Range, NM

(3) Alternatives. The T&E JCSG proposed three basic alternatives, each with several options.

(a) Realign the Aviation Technical Test Center, Fort Rucker, AL. This test activity, subordinate to the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), consists of 89 individuals who conduct aviation open air range testing. The T&E JCSG proposed relocating this activity to one of three sites: Yuma, AZ (Army); Edwards Air Force Base, CA, and Patuxent River, MD (Navy). Each option transferred mission, personnel, and equipment without resulting in a base closure or significant realignment. Since no option appeared financially attractive, the Army did not adopt this alternative.

(b) Realign Aviation Qualification Test Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base, CA. This activity, subordinate to TECOM and located on an Air Force installation, consists of 84 people, who conduct aviation qualification testing on open air ranges. This alternative relocated the directorate to one of two sites: Patuxent River, MD (Navy) or Yuma, AZ (Army). Since both options required minor workload shifts without significant financial return, the Army did not adopt this alternative.

(c) Realign the Armaments/Weapons Measurement Facility, Redstone Technical Test Center, Redstone Arsenal, AL. There are 47 people conducting armaments/weapons measurements on open air ranges associated with this alternative. Options included relocating this activity, also subordinate to TECOM, to one of six sites: Yuma, AZ (Army); White Sands

Missile Range, NM (Army), NM; Point Mugu, CA (Navy); China Lake, CA (Navy); Eglin AFB, FL; and Holloman AFB, NM. Of the six option!;, none achieved a financial return on investment within 20 years. The Army did not adopt this alternative

(4) **Summary.** Each T&E JCSG alternative represented minor work load shifts well below BRAC thresholds. Accordingly, there was no opportunity for base closure or realignment None of these T&E JCSG alternatives were adopted by the Army.

C. Laboratories:

(1) Focus. The Laboratories Joint Cross-Service Group (LJCSG) categorized Lab workload into 29 common support functions (CSF). Excluding all workload identified as "service unique;" the LJCSG recommended transfers from Army activities in 4 CSF:

Fixed Wing Structures, Propulsion, Avionics & Weapons
Manpower & Personnel
Training Systems

(2) Affected Installations. The LJCSG evaluated data from the following Army installations and activities:

- Armaments Research, Development and Engineering Center, Picatimy, NJ
- Army Research Institute (ARI), Alexandria, VA
- Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD
- Aviation Research, Development and Engineering Center, St. Louis, MO
- Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center, Redstone Arsenal, AL

(3) Alternatives. The LJCSG proposed five basic alternatives:

(a) Realign Directed Energy, Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD. This option involved the transfer of **45** individuals to Kirtland AFB to do directed energy research It did not have a favorable financial payback; therefore, the Army did not adopt this alternative.

(b) Realign Fixed Wing, Aviation Research, Development and Engineering Center, St. Louis, MO. This activity, consisting of **4** people working on fixed wing systems, would be transferred to Patuxent River (Navy), or Tinker AFB. Because of its size and negative financial impact, the Army did not adopt this alternative.

(c) Realign Energetics, Armaments Research, Development and Engineering Center, Picatinny, NJ. The energetics/explosives workload associated with this activity consists of 18

people who would relocate to Crane, IN (Navy:). This alternative had no favorable return on investment and was not adopted.

(d) Realign Energetic Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center, Redstone Arsenal, AL. The energetics/propulsion workload associated with this activity consists of 7 people who would relocate to China Lake, CA. This alternative had no favorable return on investment and was not adopted.

(e) Realign Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and Energetics, Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center, Redstone Arsenal, AL. These workload alternatives affect **243** people who would be transferred to Patuxent River (Navy) or Wright-Patterson AFB Since the financial break-even point exceeded 100 years, this alternative was not included in the Army recommendations.

(f) Realign Manpower and Personnel, and Training Division of the Army Research Institute (ARI), Alexandria, VA. This alternative divided the current organization and transferred elements to Orlando, FL. This alternative was not operationally or financially attractive. Accordingly, the Army did not adopt this alternative.

(4) Summary. Each LJCSG alternative represented minor work load shifts well below BRAC thresholds. Therefore, there were no opportunities for base closure or realignment. None of these LJCSG alternatives were adopted by the Army.

D. Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT):

(1) Focus. The UPT JCSG examined two categories of flight training - fixed and rotary Only the rotary wing category was applicable to the Army.

(2) Affected Installations. One Army installation, Fort Rucker, AL, was studied

(3) Alternatives. The UPT JCSG alternative transferred Navy UPT to the Army; therefore, the Navy was responsible for the analysis.

(4) Conclusion. No Army staff analysis was required

E. Medical Treatment Facilities:

(I) **Focus.** The Medical JCSG initially examined three categories - clinics, hospitals, and medical centers. One category, clinics, was eventually dropped from study by the JCSG

(2) Affected Installations. The following Army installations/activities were evaluated by the Medical JCSG.

Army Community Hospitals (ACH)

- Fox Army Community Hospital at Redstone Arsenal, AL
- Noble Army Community Hospital at Fort McClellan, AL
- Lyster Army Community Hospital at Fort Rucker, AL
- Bassett Army Community Hospital at Fort Wainwright, AK
- Bliss Army Community Hospital at Fort Huachuca, AR
- Weed Army Community Hospital at Fort Irwin, CA
- Evans Army Community Hospital at Fort Carson, CO
- Martin Army Community Hospital at Fort Benning, **GA**
- Winn Army Community Hospital at Fort Stewart, **GA**
- Irwin Army Community Hospital at Riley, KS
- Munson Army Community Hospital at Fort Leavenworth, KS
- Blanchfield Army Community Hospital at Fort Campbell, *KY*
- Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox, KY
- Bayne-Jones Army Community Hospital at Fort Polk, **LA**
- Kimbrough Army Community Hospital at Fort Meade, MD
- Wood Army Community Hospital at Fort Leonard Wood, MO
- Womack Army Medical Center at Fort Bragg, NC
- Patterson Army Community Hospital at Fort Monmouth, NJ
- Keller Army Community Hospital at West Point, NY
- Reynolds Army Community Hospital at Fort Sill, OK
- Moncrief Army Community Hospital at Fort Jackson, SC
- Darnall Army Community Hospital at Fort Hood, TX
- McDonald Army Community Hospital at Fort Eustis, **VA**
- Kenner Army Community Hospital at Fort Lee, **VA**
- Dewitt Army Community Hospital at Fort Belvoir, **VA**

Army Medical Centers (AMC)

- Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (AMC), CO
- Eisenhower Army Medical Center at Fort Gordon, **GA**
- Tripler Army Medical Center at Fort Shafter, HI
- William Beaumont Army Medical Center at Fort Bliss, TX

- Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, TX
- Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis, WA
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C.

(3) Alternatives. The Medical JCSG made six proposals affecting Army installations:

(a) Close Fitzsimons AMC, CO. The Fitzsimons AMC alternative is consistent with the Army's analysis. It was both operationally and financially sound. The Army agreed with the JCSG alternative to close Fitzsimons AMC (See Chapter 4.)

(b) Realign Dewitt Hospital to a clinic at Fort Belvoir, MD. Realigning Dewitt ACH to a clinic proved to be too costly. Moreover, realignment of Dewitt ACH to a clinic would compromise that facility's key role in the new managed care initiative (The Northern Virginia Primary Care Project). The Army did not adopt this alternative.

(c) Realign Xenner Hospital to a clinic at Fort Lee, VA. This alternative was viable and cost effective. The Army recommends downsizing Fort Lee hospital to a clinic

(d) Realign Noble Hospital to a clinic at Fort McClellan, AL. The Army is recommending closure of Fort McClellan; therefore, the Army did not adopt this alternative (See Chapter 4.) However, if Fort McClellan does not close, the Army supports downsizing the hospital to a clinic.

(e) Realign Kimbrough Hospital to a clinic at Fort Meade, MD. This alternative is viable and cost effective. The Army recommends downsizing the Fort Meade hospital to a clinic (See Chapter 4.)

(f) Realign Lyster Hospital to a clinic at Fort Rucker, AL. Realigning Lyster ACH to a clinic was not cost effective. Further, this realignment would reduce medical support to Flight Surgeon certification and the Army Aviation School. The Army did not adopt this alternative

(4) Summary. The Army accepted three of the six alternatives, i. e. closure of Fitzsimons AMC, and the realignment of Kenner Army Hospital (Fort Lee) and Kimbrough Army Hospital (Fort Meade) to clinics. The Army modified the SCSG recommendation to realign Noble Army Hospital (Fort McClellan) to a closure option since the department is recommending the closure of Fort McClellan.

F. Maintenance Depots:

(1) **Focus.** The JCSG-DM identified 14 categories of common support functions. Most were further divided into sub-categories. The common support functions were:

Aircraft airframes
Aircraft components
Engines (gas turbine)
Missiles and components
Amphibians
Combat vehicles
Ground/shipboard communications and electronic equipment
Automotive/construction equipment
Tactical Vehicles
Ground general purpose
Sea systems
Software
Special interest items
Other

(2) Affected **Installations.** The Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group (DM-JCSG) focused on the **24** DoD maintenance depots of which five were Army depots:

- Anniston AD, Anniston, AL
- Corpus Christi AD, Corpus Christi, TX
- Letterkenny AD, Chambersburg, PA
- Red River AD, Texarkana, TX
- Tobyhanna AD, Tobyhanna, **PA**

(3) Alternatives. The DM-JCSG provided the military departments with two alternative packages. Within these alternatives, **32 work** packages (or transfers) affected Army installztions. Of these work packages, only 17 required Army analysis **as** the losing department. In addition, the JCSG recommended closure of **Red** River **and** Letterkenny **Army** Depots. For simplicity, these work packages are discussed below in terms of affected Army installations.

(a) Realign small arms work from Anniston **Army** Depot. The transfer of small arms workload to Marine *Corps* Logistics Base, Albany involved 144 personnel. This alternative produced a little over *six* million **dollars** in cost savings over a twenty year period. The Army is the major user of **small** arms and the acquisition lead of all small arms for DoD. Accordingly, the Army decided to retain control of the life cycle support of this function. The Army did not adopt this alternative.

(b) Transfer landing gear, avionic, APU's, and engines out of Corpus Christi Army Depot. The majority of workload contained in these options was associated with rotary-wing aircraft. The Corpus Christi work packages were financially supportable; however, the Army is the largest user of rotary-wing aircraft and CCAD is the Army's Center for Technical Excellence (CTX) for rotary-wing repair. Continued concurrent repair of these components is essential to maintain weapons system integrity. Therefore, the Army decided to retain these workloads.

(c) Move missiles, towed artillery, and self-propelled artillery and close Letterkenny Army Depot. This option transferred missile guidance workload to Anniston and other military department depots. Towed and self-propelled artillery would be transferred to Marine *Corps* Logistics Base, Barstow and Anniston Army Depot. In contrast, the Army's recommendation (realign Letterkenny) transferred wheel vehicle maintenance, including towed and self-propelled artillery, to Anniston, AL. DoD missile workload, sited at Letterkenny by the BRAC 93 Commission, would be modified as follows: missile guidance and control systems will be disassembled at Letterkenny, transferred to Tobyhanna (127 miles away) for work, and returned to Letterkenny for assembly and certification. The Army option preserved the basic intent of single site missile maintenance service and was financially more advantageous than the JCSG proposal (See Chapter 5.)

(d) Move combat vehicles, construction equipment, and missiles transferred out of and dose Red River Army Depot. The Army analysis supported the JCSG-DM alternative with some modification. The JCSG proposal transferred vehicle and missile workload to Anniston Army Depot and to the **Marine** Logistics Base, Albany, **GA.** The Army's recommendation moved vehicle workload to Anniston and missile work to Letterkenny/Tobyhanna. This option was financially more advantageous than the JCSG proposal (See Chapter ***5.)***

(e) Transfer missiles, avionics, and communications and electronics workload out of Tobyhanna Army Depot. JCSG-DM alternatives consisted of three options affecting Tobyhanna: transfer of communication and electronics to the *Air* Force, avionics to the Navy, and missiles to Anniston. In each case, the financial impact did not justify the closure. Therefore, these DM JCSG alternatives were not included in the Army recommendations.

(4) Summary. Of the **17** JCSG-DM recommended work packages and two closures, the **Army** accepted 3 work packages, modified 6 others, and rejected **8** due to cost or operational reasons The Army supports the closure candidates (Letterkenny and Red River Army Depot) proposed by the **JCSG-DM.**